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ABSTRACT

Research results have shown that more than half of aviation, aerospace and aeronautics
mishaps/incidents are attributed to human error. Although many existing incident report
systems have been beneficial for identifying engineering failures, most of them are not designed
around a theoretical framework of human error, thus failing to address core issues and causes of
the mishaps. Therefore, it is imperative to develop a human error assessment framework to
identify these causes.
This research focused on identifying causes of human error and leading contributors to
historical Launch Vehicle Ground Processing Operations mishaps based on past mishaps,
near mishaps, and close calls. Three hypotheses were discussed. The first hypothesis
addressed the impact Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
contributing factors (unsafe acts of operators, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision,
and/or organizational influences) have on human error events (i.e. mishaps, close calls, incident
or accidents) in NASA Ground Processing Operations. The second hypothesis focused on
determining if the HFACS framework conceptual model could be proven to be a viable analysis
and classification system to help classify both latent and active underlying contributors and
causes of human error in ground processing operations. Lastly, the third hypothesis focused on
determining if the development of a model using the Human Error Assessment and Reduction
Technique (HEART) could be used as a tool to help determine the probability of human error
occurrence in ground processing operations.
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A model to analyze and classify contributing factors to mishaps or incidents, and generate
predicted Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) of future occurrence was developed using the
HEART and HFACS tools. The research methodology was applied (retrospectively) to six
Ground Processing Operations (GPO) Scenarios and 30 years of Launch Vehicle Related Mishap
Data. Surveys were used to provide Subject Matter Experts’ (SMEs) subjective assessments of
the impact Error Producing Conditions (EPC) had on specific tasks.
In this research a Logistic Binary Regression model, which identified the four most significant
contributing HFACS human error factors was generated. This model provided predicted
probabilities of future occurrence of mishaps when these contributing factors are present.
The results showed that the HEART and HFACS methods, when modified, can be used as an
analysis tool to identify contributing factors, their impact on human error events, and predict the
potential probability of future human error occurrence. This methodology and framework was
validated through consistency and comparison to other related research. A contribution
methodology for other space operations and similar complex operations to follow was provided
from this research. Future research should involve broadening the scope to explore and identify
other existing models of human error management systems to integrate into complex space
systems beyond what was conducted in this research.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Background
In our world, we have unfortunately witnessed some disasters and incidents due to human
error, such as the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster on January 28, 1986 in which the United States
lost the entire Space Shuttle Crew, the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Disaster of April 26, 1986 where
many lost their lives and thousands were impacted by a steam explosion and fires, resulting in
radio activity released into the atmosphere, the Bhopal Industrial Disaster of December 1984,
where at least 2,500 people were killed and more than 200,000 were injured due to a gas leak of a
highly toxic chemical, methyl isocyanate (MIC) (Reason, 1990).
One of the identified main contributors to these incidents has been rooted back to Human
latent errors. In this review, an overview of human error, the various types, approaches, models
and methodologies that have been developed to help minimize these errors is discussed. An
assessment of what has and hasn’t been effective and a future potential work for determining the
best types and approaches for Safety Critical domains is also discussed. In order to determine
whether the current model and methods of minimizing human error is sufficient or identify where
the gaps are, the current body of knowledge on this topic should be addressed. This review covers
various aspects of this topic.
The Literature review covers many aspects of human error including some of the following
areas: Human Error Defined, Understanding Human Error/The Nature of Error, Human Error
Performance, Human Error - Two Main approaches, Active Failures and Latent Conditions,

1

Reasons’ Conceptual Model, Consequences of Human Error, Managing Human Error,
Management Systems and Effective Risk Management.
Problem Statement
In 1993, NASA found that 78% of the incidents related to Space Shuttle Ground Processing
Operations, since April 1991, was a result of human error (Perry et al., 1993). Unfortunately, most
incident reports are not designed around a theoretical framework of human error. Even though
these types of report systems have been beneficial for identifying engineering and mechanical
failures, they have failed to address the core issues and causes of failure due to human error. This
makes the intervention and integration of a strategy to reduce human error difficult, due to limited
background and knowledge of human factors by the workers. In this research, it is important that
human factor issues are addressed and a comparative analysis of existing databases be conducted
to determine the human factors responsible for the failures, mishaps, etc. (Wiegmann and Shappell,
2001).
Research Objective
In this research the goal is to develop a model that can analyze and classify contributing
factors to human error mishaps, close calls, or incidents during Launch Vehicle Ground Processing
Operations and be used as a tool to accompany preexisting accident investigation and analysis
systems in controlling and/or minimizing human error. NASA KSC was utilized as the core data
for this research, due to its premises being America’s major Spaceport.
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The goal is also for the developed model to be sound from an ergonomic, mathematical
and human factors standpoint. This research adds to the human factors body of knowledge in the
area of human factors, by providing the ergonomic mathematical results from the Human Error
Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS) tools.
Contribution to the Body of Knowledge
This research adds to the body of knowledge by developing an innovative approach to
evaluating Aerospace Industry mishap data for the purpose of gaining additional insight that can
be applicable in mitigating future risks. This involves modifying and validating a human error
tool such as the Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) model in order to assist in the
identification and analysis of contributing factors to human error, resulting in mishaps,
incident and close calls. There is a need to explore the use of HEART and HFACS as viable
tools to use within the NASA Ground Processing Operations to effectively bridge the gap
between theory and practice concerning the genesis of human error causation (Wiegmann,
2001).
Two underlying human error factors
According to James Reason, two underlying factors leading to accidents are: Active
failures and Latent Conditions (Reason, 2000).
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Active failures (also known active errors) effects are felt almost immediately and latent
errors, whose adverse consequences may lie dormant within the system for a long time, only
become evident when they combine with other factors to breach the systems’ defenses (Rasmussen
& Pedersen, 1984; as cited in Reason, 1990). Active failures are difficult to foresee and are directly
created by the individual. Active failures include slips, mistakes, oversights or direct violation of
procedural requirements. Latent conditions are considered “resident pathogens” that can produce
a problem within the system.

This research adds to the body of knowledge by analyzing and gaining knowledge by
means of better understanding the contributing latent errors that impact or influence human
error during ground processing operations. System failures often occur when a combination
of particular latent failures occur, thus causing a system to fail. When isolated, occurrences
have less impact or importance, but when strategically combined, even the most extraordinary
safety-oriented systems can experience catastrophic results, as in the case of the Shuttle
Challenger incident (Cook, 1994).
As it relates to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the aviation industry,
when describing errors in the cockpit, latent errors committed by officials within the
management hierarchy are factors that directly influence the condition and decision of pilots
(Reason 1990). This shows that latent errors can impact workers’ decisions.
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Significance of Research
The data in this research was used with the intent that other organizations may be able to
use it for similar complex processes. The current processes used at NASA KSC is discussed
further in the Literature Review chapter Research Gap discussion. This research can be beneficial
to the NASA S&MA Directorate by providing methods and techniques that can be used to help
assess and classify causes of human errors, which are identified with specific KSC Ground
Processing Operation tasks, from an ergonomic, organizational and management perspective.
Research Question
With the objective of this research previously stated in this chapter, the specific
research question is:
1. What are the identified leading human error causes and contributors to historical
Launch Vehicle Ground Processing Operations mishaps and findings based on past
mishaps, near mishaps, and close calls? Quantifying this data and identifying the
leading cause is essential in the research analysis.
Research Hypotheses
Research Variables
Independent variable: Contributing Factors (i.e. unsafe acts of operators, preconditions for
unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and/or organizational influences (multiple causes)).
Dependent Variable: Human error event (i.e. mishaps, close calls, incident or accidents).
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Hypothesis 1
H0: Contributing factors: unsafe acts of operators, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe
supervision, and/or organizational influences (multiple causes) do not have an impact on human
error events (i.e. mishaps, close calls, incident or accidents) in NASA ground processing
operations.
H1: Contributing factors: unsafe acts of operators, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe
supervision, and/or organizational influences (multiple causes) do have an impact on human error
events (i.e. mishaps, close calls, incident or accidents) in NASA ground processing operations.
Hypothesis 2
H0: The HFACS framework conceptual model can be proven to be a viable analysis and
classification system to help classify both latent and active underlying contributors and causes of
human error in NASA ground processing operations.
H1: The HFACS framework conceptual model cannot be proven to be a viable analysis
and classification system to help classify both latent and active underlying contributors and causes
of human error in NASA ground processing operations.
Hypothesis 3
The HEART technique is a quantitative tool that analyzes ergonomic factors that have a
substantial negative impact on human performance.

This tool was used for KSC Ground

Processing Operations and to help identify and calculate the human error probability.
H0: The development of a model using the HEART assessment can be used as a tool to
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help determine the probability of human error occurrence in NASA ground processing operations.
H1: The development of a model using the HEART assessment cannot be used as a tool to
help determine the probability of human error occurrence in NASA ground processing operations.
Independent variable: Contributing Factors (identified by the SMEs for specific Scenarios
of tasks performed for NASA KSC ground processing operations).
Dependent Variable: Probability of a Human error event (i.e. mishaps, close calls, incident
or accidents).
Theoretical Framework
The Theoretical Framework is a conceptual model used to establish a structure for
understanding research, identifying the variables that will be measured, understanding their
relationship and their significance to the research problem. This guides the research, provides
background support and justification for studying the research problem.
A theoretical framework can provide a diagram to display the relationship between the
variables involved. What are the contributing factors that lead to human error mishaps? What is
an effective way to classify, assess and categorize human error for future prediction and to reduce
future human error mishaps? Table 1 and Figure 1 outlines the dynamics of the Generic Error
Modeling System (GEMS) used to relating Reasons’ three basic error types to Rasmussen’s three
performance levels (Reason, 1990).
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Table 1: Reason’s three Basic Error Types in relation to Rasmussen’s three Performance Levels
(Reason, 1990)

Performance Level
Skill-based level

Rule-based level

Knowledge-based
level

Description
Automated non-cognizant errors of automatic
processing (attention/memory) during regular
Slips and lapses routine actions that are identified quickly
(Reason, 1990).
Error Type

Rule-based
mistakes

Errors of rule-based behavior. For example:
applying the wrong rule for a given situation (often
with a tendency to keep repeating the same wrong
actions “strong but wrong”).

Knowledgebased mistakes

Errors of cognitive (knowledge-based) processing
whereby a problem is not analyzed correctly (or not
at all) and this results in an error (e.g. wrong
response to a multitude of alarms based on an
incomplete understanding of the actual problem).

GEMS is a broad framework used for recognizing the origins of the basic human error
types (Reason, 1990). It is an effort to provide an integrated framework of the error types operating
at all three levels of performance: Skill based, Rule based and Knowledge based. This is a hybrid
of two sets of error theories proposed by Norman (1981) and Reason and Mycielska (1982)
(Reason, 1987).
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Basic Error Type

Skill Based
Level

Slip
Unintended
Action

Unsafe
Acts

Lapse

Attentional Failures
Intrusion, Misordering, Omission,
Reversal, Mistiming
Memory Failures
Omissions, Repetitions, reduced
intentionality
Rule based mistakes

Mistake
Intended
Action

Misapplication of good rule,
Application of bad rule
Knowledge based mistakes
Confirmation bias, Selectivity,
Vagabonding
Routine violations

Violation

Exceptional violations
Acts of Sabotage

Figure 1: Generic Error Modeling System – GEMS (Reason, 1990)
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Human Error
Human Error - According to Reason (2008), “Although there is no one universal agreed
definition of error, most people accept that it involves some kind of deviation” (p. 29). So, as there
are different definitions for human error, there can also be various classifications. These
classifications can be based on intention, action, the outcome and contextual factors (Reason,
2008).
Erik Hollnagel prefers the term “erroneous action” instead of human error, which he
defines as “an action which fails to produce the expected results and which therefore leads to an
unwanted consequence” (Hollnagel, 1993). T.B. Sheridan defines it as “an action that fails to meet
some arbitrary implicit or explicit criterion”. Despite the difference in specific definition, these
both allude to the subjective element that the definition of human error must incorporate (Sheridan,
2008).
Understanding Human Error/The Nature of Error
Human error can typically be classified into four basic elements of error. These elements
depend on intention, action, the outcome and contextual factors (Reason, 2008). Below are brief
explanations of these classifications.
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Intentions
When we look from the perspective of intention, there are some questions that must be
considered. 1. Was the error planned, was it an authentic oversight or was it a neglection of
following designated procedures? 2. If the action resulted in an unwanted resulted, then was the
action a mistake of following directions? (Reason, 2008).
Actions
Errors in the action classification, deal with the behavior of the individual and the type of
action that generated the error. Some examples of this would be, the act of omission (a step that
is planned, but is not performed), repetition (unnecessarily repeating steps that have previously
been performed), and misordering (the correct actions are performed, but in the wrong order)
(Reason, 2008).
Contextual Factors
Errors based on contextual factors have to deal with the situation or environment in which
the error is generated. Some of these situations or environments can be more prone to errors than
others. Some contextual errors consist of: Interruptions and distractions (when an individual is
following an individual, may believe they are ahead or behind in steps and could potentially repeat
unnecessary or unwanted steps). Stress can be another factor, in which the environment or task
can create stress, fear, noise or fatigue, which can increase the likelihood of an error (Reason,
2008). Another factor is when an individual is in a process or procedure and is then unexpectantly
interrupted or distracted. When the individual returns to this process, they may not specifically be
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aware of where they were in the process. Joseph Sharit (2012) provides a basic human error
framework. This framework consists of: human fallibility, context and barriers (Sharit, 2012).
Human Fallibility
The human fallibility component deals with the essential sensory, cognitive, and motor
limitation of humans and an abundance of other behavioral tendencies that put humans in a position
to generate an error.
Context
The context component deals with situational variables that can have an influence, shape,
force, form or have some type of impact on the human’s behavior and how their performance
variability can lead to an error or unwanted consequences.
James Reason (2008) states, “We cannot easily change human cognition, but we can create
contexts in which errors are less likely and, when they do occur, increase their likelihood of
detection and corrections” (p. 32).
S.W. Dekker (2005) states that “Human actions are embedded in contexts and can only be
described meaningfully in reference to the details of the context that accompanied and influenced
them” (Dekker, 2005). Joseph Sharit, goes on to state, “The attribution and expression of human
error will thus depend on the context in which task activities occur” (p. 737).
The barriers’ component deals with the various ways in which human errors or
performance failures can be contained and human error is typically viewed as being produced by
some form of interplay between human fallibility and context (Sharit, 2012).
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Context
Variability in conditions
Barriers
Variability in barriers
Human
fallibility
Variability in performance

Accidents
-Anticipated events
-Unanticipated events
-Emergent events

Figure 2: Framework for Understanding Human Error and its Potential for Adverse Consequences
(Sharit, 2012)

Another aspect of human fallibility is the possibility for human error to be affected by
personality traits. A submissive or compliant personality may be hesitant to interject, probe or
question an outgoing worker concerning the information that is being communicated or
aggressively pursue information from that person, particularly if that working person is perceived
to have an aggressive temperament or assumes a high job status, which could lead to false
assumptions (Sharit, 2012). Personality behaviors that reflect temperaments toward selfconfidence, meticulousness, and insistence could also include the possibility for errors (Sharit,
2012).
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An overconfident personality can lead to being a risk risker and this behavior can and has
been implicated as a contributing factor in a number of accidents or even having the predisposition
to taking risks (Sharit, 2012).
It is very important that we understand the types and aspects of human error or components
that are related to human error. Design Error is one of those aspects and deals with the role of
automation in human error, human error in maintenance operations, and the use of incident
reporting systems (Sharit, 2012).
An example of design error can be illustrated in a case study presented by Cao and Taylor
that dealt with the user’s adaptation to new technologies. This case study focused on the effects
of introducing a remote robotic surgical system for laparoscopic surgery on communication
amongst the operating room team members (Cao and Taylor, 2004).

In this research,

communication was examined using a framework denoted as common ground, which characterizes
a person’s knowledge or expectations about what other people in the communication setting know
(Clark and Schaefer, 1989). From this study Cao and Taylor suggested training to attain common
ground, possibly through the use of rules or an information visualization system that could
facilitate the development of a shared mental model among the team members (Stout et al., 1999).
This was exemplified when a new technology was used such as a surgical robot and if issues arise
if or when roles change and the use of the new technology are less familiar to particular team
mates, which can compromise the expectations of communication from the team (Sharit, 2012).
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Human Performance
In the big picture of human performance, James Reason states that it is divided into three
levels: skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based (Reason, 2008).
Skill-Based
Skill based performance is developed by the effort of practice and self-discipline. With the
readjusting of our perceptions, we can gradually develop and obtain the fundamental principles or
practices of a skill (Reason, 2008).
Rule-Based
Rule based is an intermediation between the skill-based and the knowledge-based, due to
the need to break away from a sequence of largely habitual (skill-based) activity to interact with
some form of a problem, or in which our actions needs to be adjusted or modified to accommodate
some change of circumstances (Reason, 2008). According to James Reason, there are considered
three basic forms of Rule-based mistakes (Reason, 2008):
1. We can misapply a normally good rule because we fail to spot the contra-indicators.
2. We can apply a bad rule.
3. We can fail to apply a good rule.
Knowledge-Based
Knowledge based is the knowledge that is considered the beginning level by which our
actions are directed online by the slow, restricted, and arduous application of conscious attention.
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This level is dependent upon conscious images or works to guide our actions, whether in the form
of speech or the instructions of others. According to James Reason (2008), “knowledge-based
mistakes occur in entirely novel situations when we have run out of pre-packed problem-solving
rules and have to find a solution ‘on the hoof’” (p. 45).
Overall James Reason states that mistakes at both the rule-based and knowledge-based
levels are shaped by a variety of biases that are listed below (Reason, 2008):


Similarity bias – far from being random, errors tend to take forms that correspond to
salient aspects of the problem configuration (Reason, 2008).



Frequency bias – when cognitive operations are under-specified, they tend to take
contextually appropriate, high frequency forms (Reason, 2008).



Bounded rationality – the conscious workspace is extremely limited in its capacity
(Reason, 2008).



Reluctant rationality – The principle of “least effort” acts to minimize cognitive strain
(Reason, 2008).



Irrationality –Group dynamics can introduce genuine irrationality into the planning
process. Willful suppression of knowledge indicating that a certain course of action leads
to disaster (Reason, 2008).
Understanding the specification of the types of human errors are essential to understanding

the types of errors, and their patterns which can help the organization move towards finding an
effective tool to manage the human error. It is important to make sure the organization is on the
same page and understanding of human error and their roles in the organization.
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Human Error - Two Main approaches
According to James Reason, the human error problem can be observed in two ways: the
person approach and the system approach with each model providing different causation and
different philosophies of error management (Reason, 2000).
Of these two approaches they each have their difference in explained causation and
methods of managing their perspective of human error. Understanding these approaches and
properly identifying and applying the correct methodology to the operations systems will
determine the impact and effect of the methodologies used to minimize human error. Identifying
the cause of the error is essential to identifying and implementing the correct or best managing
method to help minimize human error (Reason, 2000).
Person approach
The person approach focuses on unsafe acts, errors, and procedural violations of people on
the sharp end (Reason, 2000). “At the sharp end” is defined as: involved in the area of any activity
where there is most difficulty, competition, danger, etc. (English Dictionary, n.d.). The person
approach views human unsafe acts as a result of the human abnormal mental processes, and focuses
on errors of individuals, such as forgetfulness, inattention or moral weakness. In an attempt to
counteract this behavior, tactics such as fearful poster campaigns, adding to procedures,
disciplinary measures, retraining, naming, blaming and shaming are used (Reason, 2000).
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Systems approach
The other approach is considered the System Approach in which errors are seen as
consequences, rather than focusing on the human. Counteracting methods consist more of
changing the conditions under which humans are working instead of the human condition we
cannot change. The goal is to build defenses to avert errors or mitigate their effects (Reason, 2000).
Evaluation of the two approaches - James Reasons states “The pursuit of greater safety is
seriously impeded by an approach that does not seek out and remove the error proving properties
within the system at large” (Reason, 2000).
When evaluating these approaches, the “person approach” continues to be the prominent
choice of viewing human error. With this approach, blaming the individual for the error or unsafe
act is more convenient for the leadership than to blame or hold the organization responsible for
making sure defenses are effectively in place to help minimize error. The individual is held with
total responsibility for the error. However, one of the weaknesses in this approach is that directing
total focus on the individual and the error can impede the attention or focus on the system as a
whole. This creates an overlooking neglect of two important features of human error, which is
that error is not the monopoly of the unfortunate few and mishaps tend to fall into recurrent patterns
(Reason, 2000).
In the “systems approach”, defenses, barriers and safeguards occupy a key position.
According to James Reasons’ “Swiss Cheese” Model, in an ideal world, the established defenses
would be fully intact; however, reality is more like Swiss cheese, with unsafe actions continually
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opening, closing and shifting. As unsafe acts occur at various times, there are holes opening,
closing and shifting in the Swiss cheese model. When and if these holes momentarily line up, this
is where hazards and accidents occur. Two underlying factors creating the holes in the Swiss
cheese model is: active failures and latent conditions (Reason, 2000).

Active Failures
The effects of active failures, also known as active errors, are felt almost immediately while
latent errors, whose adverse consequences may lie dormant within the system for a long time, only
becoming evident when they combine with other factors to breach the systems’ defenses
(Rasmussen & Pedersen, 1984; cited in Reason, (1990)). Active failures are difficult to foresee
and are directly created by the individual. This could be a slip, mistake, oversight or direct
violation of procedural requirements.

Latent Conditions
Latent conditions are considered “resident pathogens” that can produce a problem within
the system. In the Swiss cheese model, latent conditions can cause long-lasting holes and
weaknesses in the deficiencies, which can create untrustworthy alarms and indicators,
unmanageable procedures and design deficiencies. Latent conditions can be identified and
remedied before a hazard occurs. Unfortunately, these conditions can lie dormant for years before
they combine with active failures to create a potential hazard (Reason, 2000). These conditions
can be present from decisions by designers, builders, procedure developers, and leadership.
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Fortunately, these conditions can be identified and rectified in the early stages, such as the design
phase before any hazard effects or conditions arise.

Some holes due to active failures, others due to latent conditions.

Figure 3: Cheese Model, Successive Layers of Defenses (Public Domain)

The system approach concentrates on the conditions under which the individuals work and
tries to build defenses to avert errors or mitigate their effects.
Consequences of Human Error
One example of a consequence of human error is the Chernobyl Disaster - The Chernobyl
Nuclear Disaster is known as the worst Nuclear Disaster in History. It occurred in April 26, 1986
at 1:24 a.m. in the morning in the Ukraine. Due to a defective reactor, the concrete cap ceiling
blew off and released molten core fragmentation into the area and atmosphere. Thirty operators
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and firemen were killed within months of the disaster and thousands of others died in the months,
and years to come due to cancer and other side effects of the event. This disaster is considered a
man made one, due to the omission of procedure requirements and would fall into the category of
a latent error (Reason, 1990).
Upon investigation there were obvious design defects to the reactor and based on failure
analysis it is believed that the disaster components that created this was not new to the Soviet
Union. It was determined that this was considered a system that was hazardous, complex, tightlycoupled, opaque and an operation outside normal conditions (Reason, 1990). According to James
Reason (2000) “The complete absence of a reporting culture in the Soviet Union was the result of
the Chernobyl Disaster” (p. 768). The Soviet Union’s management structure was seen as weak,
largely remote and slow to respond. Safety was considered ranking low in the light of their
organizations goals and the operators possess only a limited understanding of the system (Reason,
1990).
Classification of Errors

When considering the classification of human error Reason (1990) explains that there are
three levels of classification: behavioral, contextual and conceptual. The behavioral level is
considered the least detailed level of the classifications. The observable aspect of this level can
include the conventional characteristics of error, such as: omission, commission, repetition and
misorders. This also includes considering the immediate consequences, such as: the nature and
extend of the damage or injury (Reason, 1990). The second level is the contextual which deals
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with limited assumptions as it relates to the cause of the error. This level recognizes the crucial
connection between the type of error generated and the situation or task in which the error
appeared. However, there is no direct relation to how the same environment or situation does not
always generate the same type of error. The third level is called the conceptual level. This level
of classification relies on theoretical inferences than on observable characteristics of the error or
its context (Reason, 1990).
Reason (1990) provides two distinctions on error: error type and error forms. “Error types”
relate to the origin of an error within a category or stage, such as: the planning stage (goal and
achieving a process), storage stage (framing the process actions) and execution stage
(implementing the storage stage plan). Reason also describes that mistakes can be divided into
two entities of "failure of expertise” and "lack of expertise.” Failure of expertise is when a plan
or solution to a problem is inappropriately fulfilled. Lack of expertise is when a person does not
have the routine or knowledge to appropriately fulfill the task and is forced to rely on previous
knowledge. These two mistake categories are similar to the "rule" and "knowledge” based levels,
described by Rasmussen (1983). “Error Forms” are forms of fallibility that appear across the board
of cognitive activities, regardless of the error type. They can be apparent in types of errors such
as mistakes, lapses and slips. Because the forms are extensive it is improbable that these error
formed incidents are connected to the fault of a single cognitive item (Reason, 1990).
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Table 2: Classification Error Types to Cognitive Stages at which they occur (Reason, 1990)

Cognitive Stage
Planning

Primary Error Type
Mistakes

Storage

Lapses
Slips

Execution

Approaches to Identifying and Assessing Human Error
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Methods/Models
Human Reliability Analysis is often referred to as “the probability of human failures”, as
it pertains to critical system interactions. Quantitative risk assessment, particularly known as
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is one of two common tools used for ensuring the safety of
systems that have hazardous potential. PRAs are used as a safety analysis tool providing beneficial
information for safety-related decision making (Salvendy, 2012).
Analysts learned early on that affecting realistic evaluation of system operations risks,
required integrating human reliability with hardware/software analysis. As it relates to Human
Reliability Analysts, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) serves as a tool for determining the
contribution to predetermined system failures, by identifying, presenting and quantifying (if
identified) human errors and/or failures (Salvendy, 2012).
PRA human errors or actions typically considered in a Probabilistic Risk Assessment are
frequently gathered into three categories: Pre-initiator human events, Initiator human events and
Post-fault human events (Salvendy, 2012):
Pre-initiator human events – Events that occur within normal operations that can cause
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hardware or systems to become unavailable once needed.
Initiator human events – Events or actions that were originated on their own or in
combination with other actions or failures that can initiate an event or occurrence.
Post-fault human events – human actions that, due to inadequate assessment of a situation,
a strategic approach to resolve the issue, leads to an inadequate repair.
Despite the fact that a HRA is considered (and recognized) as an essential component of a
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), it does not guarantee that this process will be integrated
(effectively) into PRA analyses. With research revealing that human reliability accounts for 6080% of total system risk, it is essentially imperative that the HRA analysis process be included and
significantly involved in the PRA process (as cited in Salvendy, 2012).
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM)
CREAM was proposed by Erik Hollnagel as a modified HRA tool to defining and
analyzing human error causes (Yang, et al. 2007). Its theoretical context is centered on the
classification of the error mode elements of human, technological and organizational factors
(Konstandinidou, et al. 2006).
CREAM can be used by analysts for: recognizing tasks requiring human reasoning and
hinge on cognitive reliability, determining the mental reliability state in which the reliability may
be reduced, thus creating a reduced mental reliability and foundation of risk and lastly provide an
assessment of the significant impact of human performance on system safety, which can be
implemented in a Probabilistic Risk assessment (PRA) (Konstandinidou, et al. 2006). Three major
benefits to using the CREAM method include: maximizing the capabilities of the human
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performance, minimizing the probabilities of human error and lastly maximizing the highest
potential recovery from human error occurrences (Yang, et al. 2007).
The Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP)
The Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) is considered one of the oldest
and well-known HRA methods (Swain, 1990). THERP was developed and proposed by Swain
and Guttman in 1961. The method’s development was backed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (Swain and Guttmann, 1983).

THERP is a method used for predicting human error probabilities and their tendency to
weaken a man-machine system due to isolated or a combination of human errors.

This

combination of errors can include machine functions, practices, operations processes or any other
human factors (Swain and Guttmann, 1983). One of the major differences between the steps of
THERP from other reliability analyses is the human events are replaced with machine outputs
(Swain

and Guttmann, 1983).
THERP Steps: 1) Describe the system failures, 2) Itemize and examine the associated

human operations, 3) Calculate/determine the significant error probabilities, 4) Determine the
human error effects on the system failure events, and 5) Discuss change considerations to the
system and reevaluate the system failure.
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Phase 1: Familiarization
Phase 2: Qualitative Assessment
Phase 3: Quantitative Assessment
Phase 4: Incorporation

Plant Visit

Assess
dependence

Determine success
and failure
probablilities

Review
Information from
System Analysis

Estimate the
effects of
performanceshaping factors

Determine the
effects of recovery
factors

Conduct talkthroughs and
walk-throughs

Assign nominal
Human Error
Probability (HEPs)

Perform a
sensitivity analysis,
if warranted

Perform task
analysis

Develop HRA
event trees

Supply
information to
system analysts

Figure 4: Example of Steps Encompassing THERP (Sharit, 2012).

Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is primarily based on James
Reason’s Generic Error Modeling systems (GEMS) conceptual framework. The purpose of this
framework is to identify the origin of basic human error types (Reason, 1990). Created from
Reason’s model, the HFACS lists human errors at each of the four levels of failure: 1) unsafe acts
of operators, 2) precondition for unsafe acts, 3) unsafe supervision, and 4) organizational
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influences (which can be multiple causes) (Wiegmann, 2001). Nineteen (19) causal categories
within the four categories of level of failures are also established for human failure.
HFACS was developed by Dr. Scott Shappell (Civil Aviation Medical Institute) and Dr.
Doug Wiegmann (University of Illinois) as a response to data from the Navy and Marine Corp that
identified human error as the leading primary cause for approximately 80% of all of their flight
accidents. HFACS is used to categorize human causes of accidents and serves as a means to assist
in the investigation of those causes. It also helps identify human causes of accidents, with the
objective of establishing training and prevention efforts (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001).
Below is a diagram (Figure 5) of the HFACS four levels of human failure and selected
examples (Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6) from the Nineteen (19) causal categories within the four categories.
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Figure 5: Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) Overview (Shappell, 2012).
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Table 3: Selected Examples of HFACS Preconditions of Unsafe Acts (not an exhaustive list) (Shappell, 2012)

Condition of Operators
Adverse Mental State
Loss of situational awareness

Personnel Factors
Crew Resource Management
Failed to conduct
adequate
adequate
brief brief
briefbrief
Lack of teamwork
Lack of assertiveness
Poor communication/coordination
with and between aircraft, ATC, etc.

Complacency
Stress
Overconfidence
Poor flight vigilance

Misinterpretation of traffic calls

Task Saturation
Alertness (Drowsiness)

Mental Fatigue
Circadian dysrhythmia

Failure of Leadership
Personal Readiness
Failure to adhere to crew rest
requirements
Inadequate training
Self-medication

Channelized attention

Overexertion while off duty

Distraction
Adverse Physiological State
Medical Illness
Hypoxia
Physical fatigue
Intoxication
Motion sickness
Effects of Over the Counter (OTC)
mediations
Physical/Mental Limitations
Visual Limitations
Insufficient reaction time
Information overload
Inadequate experience for complexity
of situation

Poor dietary practices
Pattern of poor risk judgment
Environmental Factors
Physical Environment
Weather
Altitude
Terrain

Incompatible physical capabilities

Display/interface characteristics

Lack of aptitude to fly
Lack of sensory input

Automation

Get-Home-Itis
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Lighting
Vibration
Toxins in the Cockpit
Technological Environment
Equipment/controls design
Checklist layout

Table 4: Selected Examples of Unsafe Acts (not an exhaustive list) (Shappell, 2012)

Errors
Skilled Based Errors
Breakdown in visual scan
Inadvertent use of flight controls
Poor technique/airmanship
Over-controlled the aircraft
Omitted checklist item
Omitted step in procedure
Over-reliance on automation
Failed to prioritize attention
Task overload
Negative habit
Failure to see and avoid
Distraction
Decision Errors
Inappropriate maneuver/procedure

Violations
Routine Violations
Inadequate briefing for flight
Failed to use air traffic controls
(ATC) radar advisories
Flew an unauthorized approach
Violated training rules
Failed Visual Flight Rules (VFR) in
marginal weather conditions
Failed to comply with departmental
manual
Violation of orders, regulations,
Standard Operating Procedures
Failed to inspect aircraft after inflight caution light
Exceptional Violations
Performed unauthorized acrobatic
maneuver
Improper takeoff technique
Failed to obtain valid weather brief
Exceeded limits of aircraft
Failed to complete performance
computations for flight

Inadequate knowledge of systems,
procedures
Exceeded ability

Accepted unnecessary hazard
Not current/qualified for flight
Unauthorized low-altitude canyon
running

Wrong response to emergency
Perceptual Errors
Due to visual illusion
Due to spatial
disorientation/vertigo
Due to misjudged distance,
altitude, airspeed, clearance
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Table 5: Selected examples of Preconditions of Unsafe Supervision (not an exhaustive list) (Shappell, 2012)

Failed to Correct a Known
Problem
Failed to correct inappropriate
behavior

Inadequate Supervision
Failed to provide proper training
Failed to provide professional
guidance/oversight
Failed to provide current
publication/adequate technical
data and/or procedures
Failed to provide adequate rest
period
Lack of accountability
Perceived lack of authority

Failed to identify risky behavior
Failed to correct a safety hazard
Failed to initiate corrective action

Failed to provide operational
doctrine

Failed to report unsafe tendencies
Supervisory Violations
Authorized unqualified crew for
flight
Failed to enforce rules and
regulations

Failed to track performance

Fraudulent documentation

Over-tasked/untrained supervisor

Failed to enforce rules and
regulations

Failed to track qualifications

Loss of supervisory situational
awareness
Planned Inappropriate
Operations

Violated procedures
Authorized unnecessary hazard
Willful disregard for authority by
supervisors

Poor crew pairing
Failed to provide adequate brief
time /supervision
Risk outweighs benefit
Failed to provide adequate
opportunity for crew rest

Inadequate documentation

Excessive tasking/workload
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Table 6: Selected examples of Organization Influences (not an exhaustive list) (Shappell, 2012)

Resource Management
Human resources
Selection

Organizational Process
Operations
Operational tempo

Staffing/manning

Incentives

Training
Background checks

Quotas
Time pressure

Monetary/Budget Resources

Schedules

Excessive cost cutting

Procedures

Lack of funding

Performance standards

Equipment/Facility Resources

Clearly defined objectives

Poor aircraft/aircraft cockpit
design
Purchasing of unsuitable
equipment
Failure to correct known design
flaws
Organizational Process
Oversight
Established safety programs/risk
management programs
Management's monitoring and
check of resources, climate and
process at ensure a safe work
environment.

Procedures/instructions about
procedures

Organizations Climate Culture

Delegation of authority

Norms and rules

Formal accountability for actions

Organization customs

Polices

Values, beliefs, attitudes

Promotion

Organizational Climate
Structure
Chain of command
Communication
Accessibility/visibility of
supervisor

Hiring, firing, retention
Drugs and alcohol
Accident investigations
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Human Error Analysis Reduction Technique (HEART)
The Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) is a Human Reliability
Analysis (HRA) developed by J. C. Williams in 1986, which uses a set of generic error
probabilities that have been adjusted by Subject Matter Expert (SME) assessors along with
controlled performance shaping factors to evaluate the likelihood of human errors that may occur
within a system (Kirwan, 1996). Performance shaping factors (PSF) encompass a variety of factors
that can directly or indirectly influence a human’s performance. In the HEART tool the PSFs are
called Error Producing Conditions (EPCs).
HEART has been suggested to be one of the most well-known HRA techniques used in
the United Kingdom (Kirwan, 1996). Through a validation of three reliability quantification
techniques performed by Kirwan (1996), HEART provides precise number estimates of the
likelihood of failure founded on the practical use of the Quantification Process (Kirwan, 1996).
The HEART method also proposes remedial measures to combat or help minimize the
likelihood of the error from occurring in a general sense (Williams, 1986).

HEART and HRA
The HRA process (see Figure 6) encompasses various risks, probability assessments and
methods that follow a 10-step model process. This ranges from the first step of defining the
problem to the final step of documentation, once the accepted human reliability is high (Sharit,
2012).
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Figure 6: General HRA Process (Kirwan, 1994)

Amongst the various HRA methods for analyzing human error, the Human Error
Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART), created by J. C. Williams in 1986 evaluates the
probability of human errors as it occurs throughout the completion of a specific task (Williams,
1988). This technique can be useful for assisting in reducing the likelihood of errors that may
occur within a system, leading to an overall reduction of error, mishaps, and other safety aspects
(Williams, 1988).
One of the benefits of using the HEART technique it that it is capable of answering both
qualitative and quantitative questions, by identifying methods to reduce human
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error impact during risk analysis (qualitative) and then the reduced risk if such an error decreasing
measure is implemented (quantitative) (Kirwan, 1997).

HEART was originally established for nuclear power and chemical process industries
(Kirwan, 1994), but for this research it was modified to fit the needs of complex space operations,
such as KSC ground processing operations.

With emphasis on more of a holistically appraisal of the reliability of human task
performance, this method originally defined the limited set of “generic” tasks by describing
nuclear power plane activities from which analysts can select. For this method, various resources
were reviewed in order to develop a limited set of “generic” tasks performed by operators of
various complex systems, including power plants. From this list the common factor tasks were
generated (Sharit, 2012).
This HRA technique is based on human performance literature, with a central premise that
when dealing with reliability and risk equations, ergonomic analysts are interested in the factors
that have a large impact on performance. The HEART method concentrates on the factors that
have a significant impact on this performance (Kirwan, 1994).

This technique allows an

ergonomist to assist engineers by identifying how important the ergonomic aspects are
quantitatively (Kirwan, 1994).
This method is considered relatively easier to apply than the Technique for Human Error
Rate Prediction (THERP) due to the fact that it is not forced to quantify large numbers of basic
subtasks (Sharit, 2012).
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Table 7: Kirwan’s HEART Process (Yang, et al., 2007)
a.

Categorize tasks into one of the generic categories.

b.

Allocate a nominal Human Error Probability (HEP) to the task.

c.

Verify the Error Producing Conditions (EPCs: effectively PSFs) which will
influence task reliability

d.

Decide the Assessed Proportion of Affect (AOA) for each EPC.

e.

Compute the task HEP.

HEART Human Error Probability (HEP)
The HEART assessment begins by taking a specific task or activity of interest performed
by the human operator and assigning it a nominal human error probability by classifying it under
a predefined generic task. This method is based on the standard that every time a task is
performed, there is a potential for some probability of error, defined as the Error Producing
Conditions (EPCs) (Kim, 2006).
The Human Error Probability (HEP) is the probability that an error will occur during the
performance of a given task (Kim, 2006).
The HEP is defined as the ratio of committed errors to the number of opportunities that are
available for errors to be made (Kim, 2006).

(1)

HEP =
Number of committed errors (Ne)_____
Number of opportunities for errors to occur (No)
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HEART classifies 9 generic task types, with projected nominal Human Error Probability
(HEP) values (see Table 8) and their proposed bounding values along with 38 EPCs. An EPC can
be: tiredness, noise, inexperience, stress, etc., all with varying degrees (Williams, 1988). Each of
the 38 Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) have a maximum predicted value called the “nominal
amount” that the nominal HEP can be multiplied by. This “EPC nominal amount” of how much the
unreliability of the condition might change (going from “good” to “bad”) was established on an
wide-ranging analysis of human performance literature (Williams, 1998).

The generic tasks used for classification may be one or more of, but are not limited to, the
38 Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) defined by this technique (see Table 9). These EPCs are
then specified for a given situation (as cited in Eastman, 2004).

The EPC(s) with the greatest negative impacts are of the greatest concern. Once the
greatest impacting EPC(s) are identified, a final error chance can be calculated from the failure
probability under the ideal condition (Williams, 1988).

Below (Table 8) are the Generic Task listed in the HEART process along with the Nominal
Error Probabilities.
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Table 8: HEART Nominal Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) (Williams, 1986)

Letter
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

H

Nominal HEP
(5th-95th percentile)
Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real
0.55
idea of likely consequences.
(0.35-0.97)
Shift or restore system to a new or original state on a
0.26
single attempt without supervision or procedures.
(0.14-0.42)
Complex task requiring high level of comprehension
0.16
and skill.
(0.12-0.28)
Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given scant
0.09
attention.
(0.06-0.13)
Routine, highly-practiced, rapid task involving
0.02
relatively low level of skill.
(0.007-0.045)
Restore or shift a system to original or new state
0.003
following
following procedures with some checking.
(0.0008-0.007)
Generic Task

Completely familiar, well-designed, highly practiced
routine task occurring several times per hour,
performed to highest possible standards by highlymotivated, highly-trained and experienced person,
totally aware of implication of failure, with time to
correct potential error, but without the benefit of
significant jobs aids.
Respond correctly to system command even when
there
is
an augmented
or automated supervisory system
providing accurate interpretation of system state.
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0.0004
(0.0008-0.009)

0.00002
(0.0000060.0009)

Table 9: HEART Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) (Williams, 1986)

Number Error Producing Condition (EPC)

1

Unfamiliarity with a situation which is
potentially important, but which only
occurs infrequently, or which is novel.

Nominal
amount
by which
unreliability
might change

X 17

2

A shortage of time available for error
detection and correction.

X 11

3

A low signal to noise ratio.

X 10

4

5

6
7

8

9

A means of suppressing or overriding
information or features which is too easily
accessible.
No means of conveying spatial and
functional information to operators in a
form which they can readily assimilate.
(e.g. Spatial and functional
incompatibility)
A mismatch between an operator’s model
of the world and that imagined by a
designer.
No obvious means of reversing an unintended
action.
A channel capacity overload, particularly
one caused by simultaneous presentation of
non-redundant information.
A need to unlearn a technique and apply one
which requires the application of an
opposing philosophy. (e.g. Operation
technique)
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X9

X9

X8
X8

X6

X6

Number Error Producing Condition (EPC)

10

The need to transfer knowledge from task
to task without loss.

Nominal
amount
by which
unreliability
might change
X 5.5

11

Ambiguity in the required performance
standards.

X5

12

A mismatch between perceived and real risk.
(e.g. Risk misperception)

X4

13

Poor, ambiguous or ill matched system
feedback.

X4

14

15
16

No clear, direct and timely confirmation of
an intended action from the portion of the
system over which control is to be exerted.
Operator inexperience. (e.g., a newly qualified
tradesman, but not an expert)
An impoverished quality of information
conveyed by procedures and person-person
interaction.

X4

X3
X3

17

Little or no independent checking or testing of
output.

18

A conflict between immediate and long
term objectives. (conflict of
objectives)

X 2.5

19

No diversity of information input for veracity
checks

X 2.5

20

A mismatch between the educational
achievement level of an individual and the
requirements of the task.

40

X3

X2

Number Error Producing Condition (EPC)

21

22

23

24

25

An incentive to use other more dangerous
procedures.
Little opportunity to exercise mind and body
outside the immediate confines of a job.
(e.g. need for postural change)
Unreliable instrumentation (enough that it is
noticed).
A need for absolute judgments which are
beyond the capabilities or experience of an
operator.
Unclear allocation of function and
responsibility.

Nominal
amount
by which
unreliability
might change
X2

X 1.8

X 1.6

X 1.6

X 1.6

27

No obvious way to keep track or progress
during an activity.
A danger that finite physical capabilities will
be exceeded.

28

Little or no intrinsic meaning in a task.

X 1.4

29

High level emotional stress.

X 1.3

Evidence of ill-health amongst operatives
especially fever.

X 1.2

30
31

Low workforce morale.

X 1.2

Inconsistency of meaning of displays and
procedures.

X 1.2

32
33

A poor or hostile environment. (e.g. likely to
impair performance)

X 1.15

26

41

X 1.4
X 1.4

Number Error Producing Condition (EPC)

Nominal
amount
by which
unreliability
might change

Prolonged inactivity or highly repetitious
cycling of low mental workload tasks (1st
half hour)

X 1.1

34

(thereafter)

X 1.05

35

Disruption of normal work sleep cycles.

X 1.1

36

Task pacing caused by the intervention of
others.

X 1.06
X 1.03

37

Additional team members over and above
those necessary to perform task normally and
satisfactorily (per additional team member).
Age of personnel performing perceptual
Perform task normally and satisfactorily. (per
tasks.
additional team
member)

X 1.02

34
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HEART Process (Williams, 1988)
1. Identify the complete range of sub-tasks that would be necessary for a human operator

to

complete within in a given task.
2. The tasks are then classified into the generic tasks provided within the HEART process with
proposed nominal human unreliability for these tasks. These are the nominal Human Error
Probability (HEP) scores for the particular task with calculated 5th – 95th percentage bounds
(see Table 8).
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3. The obvious EPCs that have high possibility or probability to have a negative effect on the
particular situation are considered. The EPCs that show evidence of having a significant affect
in this particular situation will be used by the assessor (Williams, 1988). To what extent each
EPC applies to the given task of concern is then discussed and agreed upon again by local
SMEs. EPCs should be considered as not beneficial to a work task.
4. The Assessed Proportion of Affect (AOA) for each tasks will be determined by consulting
local subject matter experts (SMEs), in which the affect proportions range from 0 to 1. The
AOA is a subjective assessment of the Error Producing Condition’s (EPC) affect or impact on
a specified Generic Task. The AOA range represents the percentage of this affect (e.g. 0.26 =
26% of the EPC maximum effect). This value will be a part of the assessed effect for each error
producing condition of the given task.
5. A final HEP is then calculated, by multiplying the HEART nominal HEP of the task by each
of the calculated assessed effects. The calculated effect is determined below:
(2)

𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
= ((𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 − 1) × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡) + 1
𝐻𝐸𝑃 = (𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) × (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑠))

6. From here a HEP value can identify the EPCs that cause a higher probability for an error to
occur and possible remedial or strategies to minimize the occurrence risk of future human
errors can be developed.

43

Classify generic task (Categories A-H)
e.g Procedural tasks with some checking, category F

Assign nominal Human Error Probability
(HEP)
e.g. Use median: HEP = 0.003

Identify Error Producing Conditions
(EPCs or PSF)
e.g. Effects of time pressure, maximum effect = x11

Assess proportion of affect of each EPC on the
nominal HEP
e.g. Use 50% of this maximum effect

Calculate final HEP
e.g. HEP=0.003 x [(11-1) x 0.50 + 1] = 0.018

Figure 7: HEART Quantification Process, (Kirwan, 1996)

Human Error Risk Management for Engineering Systems (HERMES)
The Human Error Risk Management for Engineering Systems (HERMES) is a Human
Factors methodology that provides a guide to applying pertinent human factors methods for a
specific problem (Cacciabue, 2004). In its system’s approach to applying correct Human Factors
methods, it also provides a framework of methods, models and techniques to address the issues of
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Human Risk Assessments (HRA), such as Human Error Management and the cognitive process
(Cacciabue, 2004).
The steps for the HERMES method consists of:

Figure 8: HERMES Methodology (Cacciabue, 2013).
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Human Error Rate Assessment and Optimizing System (HEROS)
The Human Error Rate Assessment and Optimizing System (HEROS) is built on a fuzzy
set concept that was developed to perform probabilistic assessments and optimization of manmachine systems (Richei, 2001). When using the HEROS method, the calculation of the
probabilities of human error can be performed by the following processes.

Table 10: HEROS Process (Richei, 2001)

HEROS Processes
(a) Description of the present environment.
(b) Description of the objective action.
(c) Assessment of associated records.
(d) Description of active employees.
(e) Assessment of supervision leadership.
(f) Development of the order of steps for task analysis.
(g) Depiction by a fault tree.
(h) Assessment of PSFs. To identify the impacts of
PSFs on assignment components can validate the
impact on actions.
(j) Calculation of human error probabilities.
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Below is an Advantage and Disadvantage Comparison Table of the seven HRAs
discussed in this Literature Review.
Table 11: HRA Advantage and Disadvantage Comparison Table
Human Error
Identification Methods

Advantages

Disadvantages

Humane Error
Assessment and
Reduction Technique
(HEART)

Useful for prediction and quantifying
human error likelihood or failure within
complex systems; Easy to use; Minimal
training required.

HEART Methodology is subjective to
SME assessment, thus affecting the
consistency.

The Cognitive Reliability
and Error Analysis
Method (CREAM)

Considered organized system approach
to quantifiably identifying human error;
very detailed.

Time consuming to implement; May be
considered complicated to a novice
analyst; appears complicated in
application.

Human Factors Analysis
and Classification
System(HFACS)

Helps categorize and classify human
error into four levels of failures.

Originally developed for Navy and
Marine Corp. Will need to be modified
for use in other fields.

Technique for Human
Error Rate Prediction
(THERP)

THERP can be used for task
performance Prediction while designing
the Human System Integration (HSI)
interaction (Yang, et al. 2007).

THERP does not offer clear processes for
performing error identification (Chandler,
2006).

Human Error Risk
Management for
Engineering Systems
(HERMES)

The HERMES methodology has
presented proficiency and usefulness in
an actual and complex application
(Yang, et al. 2007).

Human Error Rate
Assessment and
Optimizing System
(HEROS)

The importance of the Performance
Shaping Factors (PSF) and Performance
Influence Factor (PIF) values can be
easy calculated for optimizing the manmachine system (Richei, 2001).
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The application of HERMES is restricted
to the identification of safety critical
factors, or Indicators of Safety (IoS), and
their dissemination into RSA-Matrices
that serve the resolution of outlining the
present level of safety within the
organization and describing the position
methods for audits in the future (Stanton,
2013).
Even though is it minimized, there is still
some level of subjectivity when vague
linguistic statements on PSFs are selected
and modified, then conveyed into
expressions of fuzzy numbers or intervals
to allow mathematical operations to be
performed on them (Richei, 2001).

Human Error in Aerospace Industry
When considering human error in the Aerospace and Aeronautics Industry, it is imperative
to define what the terms aerospace and aeronautics mean. Merriam Webster defines aerospace as
“an industry that deals with travel in and above the Earth's atmosphere and with the production of
vehicles used in such travel: space comprising of the earth's atmosphere and the space beyond”
(Merriam-Webster, 2015). Aeronautics is defined as “a science that deals with airplanes and
flying: a science dealing with the operation of aircraft” (Merriam-Webster, 2015).
In this research, various literature journals were reviewed in order to identify the leading
contributing factors to human error in the aerospace and aeronautics industry.

Unfortunately,

from what was found, there was very limited research information from a space operations
perspective; however, research information was provided for the aeronautical industry with
considerable focus on pilot error. The aeronautical industry information found in this research
review was used as a “closely related area” to “aerospace” science that deals with the earth’s
atmosphere and the manufacture of vehicles used in space. NASA KSC Ground Processing
Operations deals with processing launch vehicles and space-craft used in the earth’s atmosphere
and beyond. This data was used as a reference benchmark for leading contributing factors, which
was used in developing the categorization for the human errors listed in the KSC Mishap Data
within the 30 year time span (October 1984 – May 2014).
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Causes of Aviation Mishaps
To identify the most common human error causes as it relates to the casual categories of
Human Error taxonomies, research of Aviation/aircraft operation Mishaps were reviewed. Mishap
research shows that of the Human Error taxonomies related to operations (aeronautics industry),
the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFCAS) was found to be one of the
prominent theoretical established instruments for evaluating and examining human error as it
relates to accidents and incidents (Wiegmann et al., 2005).
A study of 523 accidents within the Republic of China (ROC) Air Force from 1978-2002
(24 years), revealed several significant associations between errors at the operation level and
organization inadequacies. These were both found at the immediate HFACS adjacent level
“Preconditions for unsafe acts” and higher levels of the “unsafe supervision and organizations
influences.” From the analysis, the greater frequencies and higher percentages of the frequency
counts and inter-rater reliability status for each HFACS category were found in the following:
Resource management (subcategories of organizational influence), Inadequate supervision
(subcategories of Unsafe supervision), Crew resource management and adverse mental states
(subcategories of Preconditions for unsafe acts), Violations, Perceptual errors, Skilled-based
errors, and Decision errors (subcategories of Unsafe acts of operators) (Li, W., 2006).
Frequency counts for the Republic of China (ROC) Air Force’s study were generated for
each HFACS category for all 523 accidents. Of the four levels and subcategories, the sublevel
errors that had the 10 highest frequency of occurrence (when ranking order of highest frequency)
are in the table below, with “Unsafe Acts” and “Preconditions for unsafe acts” being the leading
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HFACS Categories.
Level 1: Unsafe Acts (of Operators)
Level 2: Preconditions for unsafe acts (e.g. latent conditions)
Level 3: Unsafe supervision
Level 4: Organization Influences
Table 12: 10 Highest Frequency of Occurrence (in ranking order of highest frequency) (Li, W., 2006)

1. Skilled-based errors (Level 1) - Highest
2. Decision errors (Level 1)
3. Adverse mental state (Level 2)
4. Resource management (Level 2)
5. Inadequate supervision (Level 3)
6. Violations (Level 1)
7. Crew resource management (Level 2)
8. Perceptual errors (Level 1)
9. Organization process (Level 4)
10. Physical environment (Level 2) - Lowest
The HFACS tool was used in a research study concerning General Aviation accidents, in
which the focus was on the unsafe acts of aircrew. When the research constrained the analysis to
those causal categories, results indicated that Skill-based errors comprised the largest percentage
of General Aviation accidents. Following Skilled-based errors, was Decision errors, Violations
and Perceptual errors. Many of the identified accidents were linked with several HFACS causal
categories. Thus an accident could have been linked with either a Decision, Skill-based, Perceptual
error, Violation or a combination of errors. The identified accident may have also been linked
with numerous occurrences of the same type of unsafe act. The results consisted of accidents that
involved at least one occurrence of a particular unsafe act category (Wiegmann et al., 2005).
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Managing Human Error
The primary goal of managing human error is to limit the incident of dangerous errors and
producing systems that are able to endure occurrences of these errors and contain their destructive
effects (Reason, 2000). When managing human error from the “person approach”, efforts are
made to direct management resources to make individuals less fallible. From the “systems
approach” the effort is geared towards the management of several targets: the person, team,
task, workplace and institution as a whole (Reasons, 2000).
When observing Human Reliability Analysis as it applies to aviation, William Nelson
(Nelson at el., 1998) discussed an effective framework to apply human performance and
human reliability methods to the full system development cycle, so that the full effectiveness
of the methods to enhance design quality and system performance can be realized. Applying
these human factor methods as early as possible within the system development, will help
accomplish this effectiveness. This integrated design environment for human r eliability
analysis was developed at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
and its framework is comprised of five major elements (Nelson at el. 1998). Below are the
elements and a brief explanation.
•

Lessons Learned

•

Functional Analysis

•

Simulation

•

Human Performance and Human error analysis

•

Design engineering tools
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Lessons Learned
Collecting and gathering lessons learned from relevant qualitative contextual information
from operation experience can be used to learn more about the influences or contributions that lead
to human error. This can also be effective in guiding the designs to help eliminate or mitigate any
possibility of human error within those potential situations (Nelson at el. 1998).
Functional Analysis
This analysis is used to identify critical functions that must be realized and draws attention
to the design phase and maintaining this during the operation phase in order to ensure the system
objectives will be met. This system can identify the critical functions, maintenance of the
performed tasks, the resources used to maintain these functions, and the required support systems
for the operation of these resources. When a function model has been developed, system
vulnerabilities can be identified as it relates to human error and the performance of the system can
be explored in a variation of operation scenarios for various alternative designs from an either
function or assess human performance in simulation or operation tests (Nelson at el. 1998).
Simulation
Nelson’s (1998) research states that “Simulation should be viewed as a powerful tool with
which to try our various design alternatives in a tightly-coupled feedback loop to investigate design
options” (p. 211). Simulation allows the reenactment of various design alternatives and allows the
investigation of the advantages and disadvantages of the varying design features as it relates to
human performance and reliability (Nelson at el., 1998).
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Human Performance and Human Error Analysis
This analysis can be used as a tool to help identify and predict potential human errors and
how they interact with other errors and component failures which can lead to unwanted
consequences, and provide potential counteractions to help prevent or mitigate the consequences
of specific errors (Nelson at el., 1998).
Design Engineering Tools
This is considered the final element of the integrated design environment for human
performance and human reliability analysis. These tools allow systematic application of the other
design environment elements in the system development process (Nelson at el., 1998).
Of the management tools to manage and minimize human error, identifying and utilizing
the correct tool is essential to minimizing human error. In this review, human error was discussed
to help understand the current and proposed management methods and which principles of
methods could be used help minimize human error in ground support operations for space
operations at KSC. This study took a look into the various methods and if they could be used or
modified for use in ground processing operations.
An essential part of effective risk management relies on creating a reporting culture. James
Reasons (2000) states that “Without a detailed analysis of mishaps, incidents, near misses and
lessons learned, we have no way of uncovering recurrent error traps or of knowing where the
“edge” is until we fall over it” (p. 768).
Karl Weick observed that “reliability is a dynamic non-event” (Reason, 2008), which
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conveys that stable outcome is an expression of constant change rather than continuous repetition.
To create this stability, a change in one system must be compensated by another change in another
parameter (Reason, 1997). Reliability is considered dynamic because the process remains within
boundaries due to constant moment by moment adjustments and compensations by the operator or
individual. It is considered a “non-event” because safety nonevents typically draw little, if any,
attention to them (Reason, 2008). Accidents are the events that are noticed and draw attention to
them. The ongoing stable safety status is expected and although actions are generated in order to
maintain it, the safe or stable act within itself is unnoticed.
The attributes of an organization’s reliability heavily depends on an unchanging
consistency in the procedures and processes. Due to the structure, High Reliability Organizations
(HROs) are able to cope with consistent performance and the ability to manage the unexpected.
HROs are considered to have two distinguishing organization function aspects: cognition and
activity (Reason, 2008). Research has shown that high reliability organizations provide an
important model of what a resilient system consists of (Reason, 2000).
High Reliability Organizations, such as US Navy Nuclear aircraft carriers, Nuclear Power
plants, and Air traffic control centers are models of HROs (Reason, 2000). All of these are serious
jobs where depending on the type of error made, an error can be catastrophic. There are some
similar distinct characteristics and challenges that were found within these organizations when
these organizations were observed: Organization challenges, managing multifaceted challenging
technologies to avoid major failures and sustaining the capacity for meeting periods of very high
peak demands (Reason, 2000).
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Organization defining characteristics consist of: Multifaceted, internally dynamic,
sporadically, extremely collaborative, performing thorough tasks under extensive time pressure,
fulfilling challenging activities with small incident rates and an almost near total absence of
disastrous failures over several years (Reason, 2000).
High reliability organizations can reconfigure themselves. They have a repetitive mode
(organized in orthodox ordered manner). During high temporary emergencies, the control shifts
to the experts on the spot and then the organization reverts seamlessly back to repetitive controls
once the disaster has passed (Reason, 2000). From James Reason’s study, the value of High
Reliability Organizations (HRO) can be summarized in the following four bullets:
•

High reliability organizations are considered primary examples of the system approach,
because they prepare for the worst and equip themselves to handle the situation at all
levels of the organization (Reason, 2000).

•

For these organizations, the quest of safety is about making the system as strong as
possible in the mist of its human and operational hazards (Reason, 2000).

•

HRO’s have developed the skill of converting occasional setbacks into the improved
flexibility of the system (Reason, 2000).

•

High reliability organizations have a high awareness of the possibility of failure
(Reason, 2000).
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Paradox of High Reliability - With the study of high reliability there are some paradoxes.
In research we typically gain knowledge and learn more about the negative outcomes or results of
not having a high reliable system. For example, with medicine we understand more about the
disease, than how it can be best avoided or in safety, more about unwanted events than the causes
to avoid. These efforts have led some studies to learn more about the success in organizations,
rather than the failures (Reasons, 2000).
When looking at how methodologies for managing error on the open road, Paul Salmon et
al (2012) identified several forms of error management systems, methods that could be used to
generate information regarding errors, their causation, their eradication, decrease or mitigation.
These have been broadly broken down into the five methodological groups: incident reporting
systems, accident investigation and analysis methods, human error identification methods, latent
conditions identification methods and error databases (Salmon at el., 2010).
Management Systems
Incident reporting systems
This type of system collects near miss incidents, errors and safety concerns within the
safety critical domain. These near misses can be indicators of potential hazards that are just
waiting to happen. Evaluating and determining what the causes allow for preventative measures
to be taken or incorporated into the system before a real accident occurs, is essential.
Unfortunately, some workers are often reluctant to report near misses, due to the threat of personal
consequences or retaliation (Salmon at el., 2010). This is an example of how the person approach
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may affect an individual’s desire to feel comfortable with reporting close calls.
Accident investigation and analysis methods
By recreating the accident, these methods investigate the cause of the accidents, in an
attempt to recognize the human and system contributors. Identifying the causes using this method
can help mitigate future accidents from occurring. Applying the right system based accident
analysis can assist in the development of system based counteracting measure to minimize or
prevent future accidents from occurring (Salmon at el, 2010).
Human error identification methods (HEI)
This analysis tool serves as an error predictor to identify potential errors, in order to
determine and provide a preemptive strategy for investing human error in complex sociotechnical
systems and determine their contributing factors. One of the benefits of the HEI method is that in
its predictions, it allows measures to be taken proactively before an accident occurs, allowing these
counteractions to be in place earlier in the design process, before the development of the
operational system (Salmon at el., 2010).
Human error analysis (HEA)
This analysis is similar to the HEI; however, its analysis is performed from a retrospective
viewpoint. The analysis observes errors made by humans during accidents, both qualitatively and
quantitatively (Salmon at el., 2010). One of the benefits of this analysis is that prior accidents can
be thoroughly dissected and the causal factors determined for mitigating potential errors in future
operations (Salmon at el., 2010).
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Latent conditions identification methods
Inspired by James Reason, this method attempts to recognize and eradiate error-causing
conditions and the scope to which latent or error-causing conditions are a problematic concern in
the developed countermeasures created to remove latent conditions. The procedure generally
involves safety leaders using failure checklists, error types and latent conditions to evaluate the
risks related to a particular system. Once the areas of concern have been identified, remedial
measures are then proposed and implemented (Salmon at el., 2010).
Error databases
This database type contains data related to various errors that have transpired within a
particular system, their related causal factors and consequences. These databases can be used for
in-depth study, error trending, development of domain specific error taxonomies, quantitative error
analysis, and the development of error counter measures (Salmon at el., 2010).
Effective Risk Management
James Reason (2000) says “Effective risk management depends crucially on establishing a
reporting culture. Without a detailed analysis of mishaps, incidents, near misses, and “free
lessons,” we have no way of uncovering recurrent error traps or knowing where the “edge” is until
we fall over it” (p. 768). Free lessons are considered inconsequential unsafe actions that could
result in an unwanted outcome in other circumstances. Lessons like these provide opportunities
to learn from near misses and help the individual and organization (Reason, 2008).
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In recent studies concerning managing error in the transport domain, it was determined that
in comparison to other safety critical domains, where human error is a problem, systems based
error methodologies and managing tools have not been widely used (Salmon at el., 2010).
Amongst the various human error models that have been developed and been around for
over 20 years, a study of selected error management approaches, as it pertains to road
transportation, was performed (Salmon et al., 2010). As a part of this study, three questions were
asked in an effort to determine if any of the human error models previously mentioned (Incident
Reporting systems, Accident Investigations systems, Human Error Identification methods, Human
Error analysis, Latent Conditions and Error Databases) have made any significance to the
transportation domain when considered amongst other safety critical domains (Salmon et al.,
2010).
1. What contributions have human error models and methods provided within road
transport?
2. Do the current models and methods deliver adequate knowledge and tools to take action
and fight the problem within the road transportation system?
3. In consideration of technology advancement, policy and system design, what are the
potential error models and method contributions for the future?
After a Driver Behavior questionnaire was given to 520 drivers asking about their
frequency of committing various errors and violations while driving, an assessment of the human
error manage methods and their application in safety critical domains was performed. The
development of a Driver error causation factor chart was created and the answers to the previous
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three questions were determined (Salmon et al., 2010).
Answers to the three questions to define whether valuable safety advances have been, and
can continue to be made through the application of current error models and methods are below:
1. Compared to other fields in which human error has been recognized as an issue, there
has only been restricted systems based human error related research directed within the
road transport field (Salmon et al., 2010).
2. The degree to which practitioners are adequately prepared to approach an issue, is the
research’s view that the prevailing models and methods described offer adequate
information and resources to combat an error issue within road transport. Error
administration methods are significantly underutilized within road transport, and so the
question remains why is this so? (Salmon et al., 2010).
3. The probable influence of the error management methods defined within road transport
is substantial. Incident reporting systems, in which drivers report errors and error related
near miss incidents, could produce significant insights into various types of errors that
road users make. This also included the environments that encourage errors and
regaining approaches used in the event of occurring errors (Salmon et al., 2010).

KSC Mishap Data
Mishap report data can be useful for exploring the important correlations between a human
error event and its contributing factors, as well as the development of a hypothesis (Rouse, 1983).
It is significant to get in-depth of knowledge of human error for analyzing valuable information
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leading up to the actual human error event. It also is important to collect data from as many sources
available (including historical data) to assist in effectively analyzing the human error and its
contributing factors (Rouse, 1983). This section provides a brief overview of KSC Mishap Data
procedural requirements, types and tools used to assess mishaps.
Per the NPR 8621.1 “NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and Close Call
Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping”, a NASA Mishap is defined as “an unplanned event
that results in an injury to non-NASA personnel, caused by NASA operations, damage to
public/private property, occupation injury/illness to NASA personnel, NASA mission failures
prior to scheduled completion of missions, and destruction of or damage to NASA property”
(NASA, 2013).
The NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) provide the requirements for reporting,
investigating and documenting mishaps, close calls, and previously unknown severe workplace
hazards to preclude the repetition of related accidents (NASA, 2013).
Mishaps Types
There are six (6) NASA mishap types. These terms are defined from the NASA Procedural
Requirements for Mishap and Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping.
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Mishap Types
Type A Mishap
A mishap event causing either death or total permanent disability as a result of a job related
damage or sickness, a complete cost of a failed mission and asset damage equivalent to or greater
than $2 Million, exterior loss of an aircraft with a crew inside, and/or an unanticipated aircraft with
a crew inside parting from a controlled flight (NASA, 2013).
Type B Mishap
A mishap event causing either partial permanent disability as a result of a job related
damage or sickness or requiring admission into a hospital for 3 or more people within 30 work
days of the occurrence, or a complete cost of a failed mission and asset damage equivalent to or
greater than $500,000 but less than $2 Million (NASA, 2013).
Type C Mishap
A mishap event resulting a nonfatal job related damage or sickness, that caused days missed
from work, with the exception of the day or shift of occurrence, limited work of relocation to
another job with the exception of the day or shift of occurrence, requiring admission into a hospital
for 1 or 2 people within 30 work days of the occurrence, or a complete cost of a failed mission and
asset damage equivalent to or greater than $50,000 but less than $500,000 (NASA, 2013).
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Type D Mishap
A mishap event resulting in any nonfatal Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) documentable job related damage and/or sickness that doesn’t satisfy the definition of a
Type C or a complete cost of a failed mission and asset damage equivalent to or greater than
$20,000 but less than $50,000 (NASA, 2013).
Incident
A mishap or close call event.
Close Call
An event resulting in no physical damage or only insignificant damage that required first
aid, no asset damage or insignificant asset damage of less than $20,000, no physical and/or only
insignificant physical damage requiring first aid, but has a potential to result in a Mishap (NASA,
2013). Anything that does not fall under the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) recordable Injury category is considered a Close call.
Per Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) recordable injury reporting
requirements, the following events must be reported to OSHA by employers. All occupation
related fatalities, all occupation related injuries resulting in “in-patient” hospitalization for a
minimum of one (or more) employee(s), all occupation related injuries that result in amputation
and all occupation related injuries that result in a loss of an eye (OSHA, 2014). Fatalities must be
reported within 8 hours of incident awareness and within 24 hours of incident awareness for the
remaining requirements (OSHA, 2001). According to OSHA requirements (2001): “If any injury
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results in any of the following, it must also be reported: death, days away from work, restricted
work or transfer to another job, medical treatment beyond first aid, or loss of consciousness. It
must also be considered a case to meet the general recording criteria if the injury involves a
significant injury or illness diagnosed by a physician or other licensed health care professional,
even if it does not result in death, days away from work, restricted work or job transfer, medical
treatment beyond first aid, or loss of consciousness” (29 CFR Part 1904).
NASA Root Cause Analysis Tool (RCAT)
The NASA Root Cause Analysis Tool (RCAT) is used by NASA to assess Mishaps. It
was created to assist in the analysis of anomalies, close calls, and accidents along with identifying
the necessary corrective actions to help avoid future occurrences (NASA Safety Center).
The RCAT uses a repeatable method that is quick, simple, precise to execute and document
root cause analysis, develop trending data, identify needed corrective actions and produce data that
is usable in the beginning stages of analyzing and risk assessments from a probabilistic perspective
(NASA Safety Center).
The RCAT was developed after a widespread review of tools and methods that were
commercially available was found unable to support a complete root cause analysis of the unique
NASA environment and complications it deals with on Earth, in space, in the oceans, in the air, on
the moon and on planetary forms. NASA found that the prevailing current tools were developed
based on special areas such as aviation or a particular type of active or human error type, with
inadequate causal codes. This tool is a paper-based tool that works with software to deal with the
inadequacies recognized in the current exiting tools (NASA Safety Center).
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The RCAT was developed to consider the entire system, in order to address all possible
types of activities and accident causes, regardless if they originated by: the environment, wonders
of nature, software, hardware, weather, human or outside event, or could be integrated into a
timeline, a fault tree and event/causal factor tree (NASA Safety Center).
Research Gap Discussion
During this research, questions were asked in order to identify the research gaps concerning
retrospectively analyzing Mishaps relating to complex space systems such as NASA Ground
Processing Operations. The research questions were in areas of: Human Reliability Analysis,
Human Error Taxonomies and Human Error Frameworks.
The following questions were asked:
Human Reliability Analysis
1. What techniques are capable of answering both qualitative and quantitative questions, by
classifying human error producing conditions (qualitative) and calculating future probability
of human error occurrence (quantitative)?
2. What techniques are easy to use and can be performed by novice analysts?
3. What developed Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methodologies classify human error
contributing factors and error producing conditions to human error related mishaps?
4. What HRA methods provide a quantitative ergonomic approach through analysis of
ergonomic factors that may have substantial, negative effects on human performance for
Mishaps?
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5. What are the identified leading human error causes and contributors to historical
Launch Vehicle Ground Processing Operations mishaps and findings based on past
mishaps, near mishaps, and close calls?
6. What methodologies have the ability to determine quantifiable human error probability
(HEP)?
7. What methodologies have specific performance shaping factors (PSF) or Error
Producing Conditions (EPC) that are in line with complex space operations, such as
Space Ground Processing Operations?
8. What HRA method(s) are not more resource intensive than others, have low application
time and are an ease in its application?
9. Is there a Human Error probability methodology modified specifically for aerospace
complex operations, such as NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations?
Taxonomy
10. Is there a Human Error Classification system modified specifically for aerospace complex
operations, such as NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations?
11. Is there a taxonomy that provides a comprehensive human error analysis that
considers multiple causes of human failure (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001)?
12. What Aerospace industry methodology can ergonomically and cognitively,
classify mishap data for complex operations, such as NASA KSC Ground
Processing Operations?
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Framework
13. What framework conceptual model can be proven to be a viable analysis and
classification system to help identify both latent and active underlying contributors and
causes of human error in complex operations, such as KSC ground processing
operations?
14. Is there a Framework developed for retrospective Mishap analysis and the prediction of
potential future human error related mishaps for complex operations, such as KSC ground
processing operations?
15. What Framework covers ergonomic, cognitive and organizational factors in human error
related mishaps?
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1. What techniques are capable of answering both qualitative and
quantitative questions, by classifying human error producing
conditions (qualitative) and calculating future probability of human
error occurrence (quantitative)?

X

X

2. What techniques are easy to use and can be performed by novice
analysts?

X

3. What developed HRA methodologies classify human error
contributing factors and error producing conditions to human
error related mishaps?

X

4. What HRA methods provide a quantitative ergonomic approach
through analysis of ergonomic factors that may have substantial,
negative effects on human performance, for mishaps?
5. What are the identified leading human error causes and
contributors to historical Launch Vehicle Ground Processing
Operations mishaps and findings based on past mishaps, near
mishaps, and close calls?

X

X

6. What methodologies have the ability to determine quantifiable
human error probability (HEP)?

X

7. What methodology has specific performance shaping factors
(PSF) or Error Producing Conditions that are in line with
complex operations, such as Space Ground Processing
Operations?

X

8. What HRA methods are not more resource intensive than others,
have low application time and are an ease in application.

X

9. Is there a Human Error probability methodology modified
specifically for aerospace complex operations, such as NASA
KSC Ground Processing Operations?
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X

Human Error
Framework

Human Error
Taxonomy

Research Questions

Human
Reliability
Analysis

Table 13: Literature Review Gap Questions

10. Is there a Human Error Classification system modified
specifically for aerospace complex operations, such as NASA
KSC Ground Processing Operations?

X

11. Is there a taxonomy that provides a comprehensive human error
analysis that considers multiple causes of human failure
(Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001)?

X

12. What Aerospace industry methodology can ergonomically and
cognitively, classify mishap data for complex operations, such
as NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations?

X

13. What framework conceptual model can be proven to be a viable
analysis and classification system to help identify both latent and
active underlying contributors and causes of human error in
complex operations, such as KSC ground processing operations?

Human Error
Framework

Human Error
Taxonomy

Human
Reliability
Analysis

Research Questions

X

14. Is there a Framework developed for retrospective Mishap
analysis and the prediction of potential future human error related
mishaps for complex operations, such as KSC ground processing
operations?

X

15. What Framework covers ergonomic, cognitive and organizational
factors in human error related mishaps?

X

Table 14 provides a summary of the Literature Review and Research Gap. The table
shows the Literature Review researchers and the human error areas that are expected to provide
answers to the questions in this research.
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Human Error
Framework

Human
Reliability
Analysis

Researchers

Human Error
Taxonomy

Table 14: Literature Review Gap

Cacciabue, P. C. (2004)

X

X

Cacciabue, P. C. (2013)

X

X

Cao, C. G., & Taylor, H. (2004)

X

X

Chandler, F., Chang, Y., et al. (2006).

X

Clark, H. H., & Schaefer, E. F. (1989)

X

Hollnagel, E. (1993).

X

X

Kirwan, B. (1994).

X

X

Kirwan, B., Scannali, S., & Robinson, L. (1996)

X

X

Kirwan, B. (1996)

X

X

Kirwan, B. (1997)

X

X

Kim, B., & Bishu, R. R. (2006)

X

Konstandinidou, M., Nivolianitou, Z., et al. (2006).

X

Li, W., & Harris, D. (2006)

X
X

X

X

Norman, D. A. (1981)

X

X

Rasmussen, J. (1983)

X

Nelson, W. R., Haney, L. N., et al. (1998)

Reason, J. (1990)

X

Reason, J. T. (1997)

X

Reason, J. (1987)

X
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Human Error
Framework

Human Error
Taxonomy

Human
Reliability
Analysis

Researchers

Reason, J. (2000)

X

Reason, J. T. (2008)

X

Reason, J. T. & Mycielska, K (1982)

X

Reinach, S., & Viale, A. (2006)

X

Richei, A., Hauptmanns, U., & Unger, H. (2001)

X

Rouse, W. B., & Rouse, S. H. (1983)

X
X

Salmon, P. M., Lenne, M. G., Stanton, et al. (2010)

X

Salvendy, G. (2012)

X

X

Shappell, S., Detwiler, C et al. (2007)

X

Shappell, S. A., & Wiegmann, D. A. (2012)

X

Sharit, J. (2012)

X

X

Stanton, N. A. (2013)

X

X

Swain, A. D. (1990)

X

X

Swain, A. D. & Guttman, H. E. (1983)

X

X

Wiegmann, D., Faaborg, T., et al. (2005)

X

Wiegmann, D. A., & Shappell, S. A. (2001)

X

Williams, J. (1986, April)

X

X

Williams, J. C. (1988, June)

X

X

Yang, C., Lin, C. J., Jou, Y., et al. (2007)

X

X
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X

Human Error
Framework

Alexander, T. (2016)

Human Error
Taxonomy

Human
Reliability
Analysis

Researchers

X

X

Summary
In 2006, a study was conducted by the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance to
assess current Human Risk Assessments (HRA) methods and their applicability in the aerospace
industry for potential use and adaptation for current and future NASA systems and missions
(Chandler, 2006).

Even though the study evaluated the various HRA methods and their

applicability to human interfacing for hardware preservation activities, such as ground processing
and flight operations, launch, mission control and space flight teams, its primary focus was to offer
recommendations for the “quantitative analysis of space flight crew human performance in the
support of Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs)” (Chandler, 2006).
The HRA methods identified from this research as suitable for aerospace application when
conducting NASA PRAs were: THERP, CREAM, Nuclear Actions Reliability Assessment
(NARA) and Standardized Plant Analysis Risk HRA Method (SPAR-H) (Chandler, 2006).
However, these methods were identified for PRAs performed on new space flight vehicles system
designs and not ground processing hardware and operations that support the vehicle maintenance
and processing (Chandler, 2006).
Research shows that organizations such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
and NASA have studied and examined the use of HFACS as a complement to preexisting
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accident investigation and analysis systems.

Results of the HFACS framework have

demonstrated that it can be a viable tool for use within the civil aviation arena. However, there
are still few system efforts that have examined whether HFACS is a viable tool with the civil
aviation industry (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001).
To date, no documented research has specifically used the HFACS as a model to verify
if it is a viable tool for assessing human error within NASA Launch Vehicle Ground
Processing Operations. This research will bridge the gap of using this analysis to verify its
validity in classifying, assisting, investigating and analyzing human causes of accidents. This
works as a part of a larger process to help minimize risks and human error in NASA Ground
Processing Operations (Wiegmann, 2001).
In 1998, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory showed that
the NASA Ames Research Center and the Boeing Commercial Airline Group developed a
human error framework (Framework Assessing Notorious Contributing Influences for Error
(FRANCIE)) and a software tool (Tool for Human Error Analysis (THEA)), that were used
in analyzing human error in respect to the design of commercial air transportation (Nelson at
el., 1998). These methods and tools were recommended for future NASA ground processing
operations, but were not applied to Launch Vehicle Program Ground Processing Operations,
the new Space Launch System (SLS), International Space Station or any manned or unmanned
space missions.
In my thorough research on Human Reliability Analysis and the Human Error
assessments and reduction technique (HEART), no documented research to date shows that
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this technique has been used specifically for assessing human error for NASA Ground
Processing Operations.
Justification for HEART and HFACS Methods
For this research, two Human Factor tools were used to classify and assess human error:
The Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) (which is a part the Human
Reliability Analysis (HRA)) and the Human Factor Analysis Classification System (HFACS).
HEART was chosen for this research because of its quantitative ergonomic approach through
analysis of ergonomic factors that may have substantial, negative effects on human performance.
This technique can provide human factor specialists with quantitative supported data for design and
other recommendations for overall improvement (as cited in Eastman, 2004).
HFACS was chosen for this research because it is considered a comprehensive analysis of
human error that takes into account multiple causes of human failure (Wiegmann and Shappell,
2001). One of the advantages to using HFACS is that the generic terms and descriptors allow it to
be used for a range of industries and activities (Reinach, 2006). Both methods are explained in
further detail in the Methodology chapter.
This introductory chapter provides the background, research gaps, objectives of this study
and research variables. The literature review provides a more detailed analysis of the human error
performance levels and approaches to identifying and assessing human error.
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CHAPTER THREE: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Informal SME Discussions
HEART
Subsequent to the Literature Review and prior to the Experimental procedure, informal
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) discussions were conducted to help identify and categorize
examples of historical Launch Vehicle specific ground processing operations tasks generally
performed during Ground Processing Operations, with the Generic Tasks listed in the HEART
Nominal Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) (Table 8) found in the Literature Review chapter.
These specific tasks will match the associated HEART proposed nominal human unreliability
probability, which includes their 5th – 95th percentile boundaries. At the same time that we are
calculating the HEP, we are also using the EPCs to match with the HFACS conditions to see what
umbrella it falls under: unsafe acts, preconditions, etc.
Three (3) KSC Launch Vehicle Ground Processing Operations SMEs, with 34 years, 31
years and 30 years of NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations experience, reviewed the
HEART Generic Tasks and provided examples of equivalent related tasks to the 8 HEART Generic
Tasks. This modified table is provided in the Methodology chapter (Table 21).
The specific ground processing operation tasks are based on a select number of
Scenarios/Locations that have been identified from the greatest frequency of generated mishaps
(recorded from the NASA KSC Mishap Data) located within the Launch Complex 39 Ground
Processing Operations area.
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Launch Vehicle Ground Processing Operation Areas found in the Mishap Data with the
highest frequency of occurrence were: Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), Launch Complex Pad
A/B (LC39 A/B) and Orbiter Processing Facilities (OPFs) 1, 2 or 3. These locations were also
independently validated by Subject Matter Experts as the locations where the majority of Launch
Vehicle Ground Processing Operations work was performed and was used as locations of
occurrence for this research’s human error related Mishaps.
The Mishap Data includes both NASA and Contractor employees and encompasses, Type
B, C, D, and Close Calls Incidents.
The SMEs contributed to the development of the Scenarios’ Tasks, Subtasks, and Error
Producing Conditions and was used for the subjective AOA assessment of the Error Producing
Condition’s (EPCs) impact on the Scenario’s Ground Processing Operations Tasks. The SMEs
also identified corresponding Error Producing Conditions for each Scenario subtask. Some Tasks
received more than one Error Producing Condition (EPC). These are identified in Tables 15-20
below.
Table 15: HEART Survey VAB Scenario 1

Task: Performing Booster Hold Down Posts
Subtasks
Error Producing Conditions

Arming the Booster
Connecting the Booster
Segments
Installing Safety Wires

Tiredness – Long hours – 3rd
Shift
Accessibility limitations
Poor lighting
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HEART
Generic Task
(Table 21)
C

HEART
EPC(s)
(Table 9)

C

22

C

33

35

Table 16: HEART Survey VAB Scenario 2

Task: Orbiter lift and mate to stack
Subtasks
Error Producing Conditions

Attaching sling and cranes

Lifting and lowering Orbiter
into position for mate
Install and attaching hardware

Heat (Orbiter lifting required
doors to be closed and coveralls
worn)
Heights, climbing ladders to
access platforms
Tripping hazards

HEART
Generic Task
(Table 21)

HEART
EPC(s)
(Table 9)

C

27

C

27

C

33

Table 17: HEART Survey OPF Scenario 1

Task: Wire Inspections inside the Vehicle, Cargo Bay, under the Floor Board
Subtasks
Error Producing Conditions
HEART
Generic Task
(Table 21)
Performing electrical tests
Accessibility limitations –
Crawling around on wires
E
bundle
Repairing/replacing wiring
Physical Stress - twisting and
E
turning
Installing/removing protective Confined working space tubing
breakable parts in or on way
E
to/from work area (air ducts,
phenolic brackets, tubing)

HEART
EPC(s)
(Table 9)

22, 27
27

5, 22, 38

Table 18: HEART Survey OPF Scenario 2

Task: Wing Closeouts
Subtasks

Elevon actuator servicing
Scheduled inspections
Modifications and repairs

Error Producing Conditions

Claustrophobic
Physical Stress - twisting and
turning
Confined working space Accessing and backing out of
small tight areas with; wire
harnesses, tubing, and struts.
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HEART
Generic Task
(Table 21)
F
F

HEART
EPC(s)
(Table 9)

F

5, 22, 38

27
27

Table 19: HEART Survey Pad A/B Scenario 1

Task: Pad Aft Closeouts
Subtasks

Error Producing Conditions

Removing access platforms
and nonflight items

Inspections, repairs
Repairs

Confined working space accessibility limitations;
crawling and climbing
around/near; wiring
bundles/connectors,
hydraulic/pneumatic lines, air
ducts, etc. Physical stress twisting and turning
Noise (air purge)
Poor lighting

HEART
Generic Task
(Table 21)

HEART
EPC(s)
(Table 9)

F

5, 22, 27

F
F

3
13, 27,
33

HEART
Generic Task
(Table 21)

HEART
EPC(s)
(Table 9)

C

22

C

22, 27

C

35

Table 20: HEART Survey Pad A/B Scenario 2

Task: Installing Engines at Pad
Subtasks
Error Producing Conditions

Installing and torqueing
hardware
Connecting lines (inspect,
clean, install seals, hardware
install and torque)
Electrical connects

Accessibility limitations –when
open below, required to wear
safety harness and lanyard
Physical stress due to installing
vertically
Tiredness – 3rd Shift Work
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HFACS
SME discussions were also conducted for identifying possible contributing factors, based
off of their expertise and experience in Launch Vehicle Ground Processing Operations. Three
SMEs independently reviewed and analyzed the HFACS four levels of human error selected
examples of “unsafe acts”, “preconditions of unsafe acts”, “unsafe supervision”, and
“Organizational Influences” provided in the literature review of this research. Then their results
were discussed and validated collectively. From their assessments, the SMEs determined that the
list of selected examples were closely related to the possible Error Producing Conditions that can
influence and be a factor is human error generated mishaps. The SMEs also determined that the
direct references to aircraft and flight should be omitted and replaced with standards, processes,
and procedures which reflect Ground Processing Operations (GPO) historically performed at the
Kennedy Space Center.

Interestingly, the SMEs stated they felt one of the biggest potential

influences to human error mishaps in GPO is confined spaces.
The modified HFACS four levels of human failure and selected examples from the nineteen
(19) HFACS causal categories, is provided in the Methodology chapter.
Below is a NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations Human Error Framework of the
three (3) Scenarios in this research, the Ground Processing Operations (GPO) Tasks performed at
the Kennedy Space Center, the HFACS four levels of human error categories and their relation to
the common errors, HFACS sublevels and specific Error Producing Conditions that lead to Human
Error mishaps at NASA.
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HFACS Sublevels/HEART
Error Producing Conditions
HFACS 4 Levels of Human Error
cations

Common Errors
Specific "Unsafe Acts"

GPO Tasks
(e.g. HEART
Generic Tasks)
/Locations

Scenarios/Locations

VAB

Unsafe Acts

Pads A/B

EPC 2,
EPC 3, etc.

Task A

Common Errors

Task B

Specific "Preconditions of
Unsafe Acts"

Task C

Preconditions of
Unsafe Acts

Task D

OPFs

EPC 1,

EPC 2,
EPC 3, etc.

Task E
Task F

EPC 1,

Common Errors
Specific "Unsafe Supervision"

Unsafe Supervision

Task G

EPC 1,
EPC 2,
EPC 3, etc.

Task H
Common Errors

Organizational
Influences

Specific "Organizational
Influences"
EPC 1,
EPC 2,
EPC 3, etc.

Figure 9: NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations Human Error Framework
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY
Research Objective
The purpose of this experiment was to develop a model that can analyze and classify
contributing factors to human error mishaps, close calls, or incidents during Launch Vehicle
ground processing operations and be used as a tool to accompany preexisting accident
investigation and analysis systems in controlling and/or minimizing human error.
For this research, historical data was retrieved from NASA KSC mishaps, close calls,
incidents, or accidents and was used to identify contributing factors associated with NASA Ground
Processing Operations.

Figure 10: Research Methodology
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Literature Review
The literature review in Chapter Two provides a comprehensive review of human error
literature, detailed analysis of the human error performance levels, approaches to identifying and
assessing human error and a review of existing models of human error and mitigation.
To this date, no documented research has specifically used a standalone or hybrid form
of the Human Factor Analysis Classification System (HFACS) and the Human Error
Assessments and Reduction Technique (HEART) as a model to verify whether it is a viable
tool for assessing human error within NASA Ground Processing Operations (Wiegmann and
Shappell, 2001).
Existing Gap
In the Literature Review chapter of this research, questions were asked in order to identify
the research gaps concerning retrospectively analyzing mishaps relating to complex space systems
such as NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations. The research questions were in the areas of:
Human Reliability Analysis, Human Error Taxonomies and Human Error Frameworks. These
questions recognized a weakness within the current literature which lacks a proven analysis
framework for classifying, assessing, investigating and analyzing human causes of accidents
in complex space systems such as NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations.
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Experiment Overview
Assessment Approach
Statistically, 70-80% of all aviation mishaps and near mishaps involve human factors
(Strauch, 2004), and a study by the U.S. Bureau of Mines also found that nearly 85% of all mining
accidents identified human error as a causal factor (Rushworth et al., 1999). For this reason, it is
essential to have good assessment approaches and tools to effectively analyze human error
research data.

For this research,

both the Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique

(HEART) (which is a part the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)) and the Human Factor Analysis
Classification System (HFACS) was used as the assessment approaches.
The proposed methodology developed a model to represent the relationship between
human error events (i.e. mishaps, incidents, or close calls) and its contributing factors. An
experimental design using a modified hybrid HEART and HFACS model to address human error
producing conditions during NASA Ground Processing Operations was generated to identify
significant contributing factors, and determine Human Error Probabilities and Predicted
Probabilities.
The HEART proposed remedial measures, to combat or assist in minimizing the likelihood
of the error from occurring, will not be used for this research (Williams, 1986).
The primary focus of this research was to use the HEART method to calculate the Human
Error Probability (HEP) and the HFACS method to categorize historical launch vehicle mishap
data and build a regression model to predict the probability of future mishaps.
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A binary logistics regression was the regression model used to predict the probability of
future mishaps based on retrospective historical Launch Vehicle Ground Operation Mishap Data.
The human error potential contributing factors were coded from the HFACS four (4) levels of human
error and selected examples of human error causes.
Data Collection
Mishap Data
The data was collected from past NASA Launch Vehicle Mishap Reports (from October
1984 – May 2014) entered into the Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS), which is now
known as the NASA Mishap Information System (NMIS). This data was used for determining
significant contributing factors and predicted probabilities.
Launch Vehicle related Ground Processing Operations data performed in the Vehicle
Assembly Building (VAB), Launch Complex Pad A/B (LC39 A/B) and Orbiter Processing
Facilities (OPFs) 1, 2 or 3 was identified and pulled from this data. Human error related data was
isolated from these data entries to identify the leading occurrence of specific types of human errors
at NASA.
Identifying the human error causes that led to the Mishaps recorded in the NASA Mishap
Information System (NMIS) is only identifiable by the detail of the data provided in the “Detail
Description” portion of the NMIS system. Therefore, each Mishap was individually read and
categorized by the “human error” information provided in the description. The qualification of what
is considered a “human error” was provided by the HFACS “human error” types. From this data,
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the occurrences of “human error” identified was the focus of this Dissertation.
Survey Participant Data
To assist with objective data and subjective data for this research’s qualitative study, SME
surveys were conducted, collected and used for analysis (Rouse, 1983). The survey requested
participants’ subjective Assessed Proportion of Affect (AOA) values for Human Error Probability
calculations.
The survey participants (aka subjects) were strategically selected from their years of
experience in NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations, Human Factors background and Mishap
Control Board experience. This includes engineering, safety and mission assurance personnel and
“on the floor” technicians. This will help ensure a balanced response to properly represent the
workforce.
Qualitative Study
HEART Method
As previously stated, the survey data collected from Launch Vehicle Ground Processing
Operations subjects was used with the HEART method to determine the Human Error Probability
of select Ground Processing Operations.
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Scenarios/Locations
As stated in the Preliminary Analysis chapter, Scenarios from the Vehicle Assembly
Building (VAB), Launch Complex Pad A/B (LC39 A/B) and Orbiter Processing Facilities (OPFs)
1, 2 or 3, was used for this research.
SME Preliminary Analysis
Subject Matter Expert discussions performed in the previous Preliminary Analysis chapter
provided examples of specific Ground Processing Operation tasks which were categorized within
the eight (8) HEART generic tasks and their associated proposed nominal Human Error Probability
(nominal human unreliability) 5th – 95th percentile range. When determining the categorized tasks,
the tasks were identified in relation to the three (3) ground processing operations scenarios (VAB,
OPFs and Pads A/B).
Below, (Table 21) represents the NASA KSC specific modified examples (in bold,
underlined and italicized) provided by the three (3) SMEs from the Preliminary Analysis chapter.
This modified table was used with the HEART Error Producing Conditions (Table 9) to calculate
the Human Error Probability of the specific KSC Ground Processing Operations tasks.
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Table 21: NASA KSC Specific Modified Examples for HEART Nominal Human Error Probabilities (HEPs)
(Williams, 1986)

Letter

Generic Task

Nominal HEP
(5 -95th percentile)
th

Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real idea of
likely consequences.
A

NASA KSC: OJT Trainee working with experienced
Technician
NASA KSC: Startracker Removal and Replacement
Shift or restore system to a new or original state on a
single attempt without supervision or procedures.

B
NASA KSC: Operating Procedure Special Instructions
allowing flexibility or rework.

0.55
(0.35-0.97)

0.26
(0.14-0.42)

Complex task requiring high level of comprehension and
skill.
C

NASA KSC: Launch Vehicle Main Engine bolt
stretching
NASA KSC: LH2/LO2 Monoball Installations
NASA KSC: Certified Turbo Pump Operations

0.16
(0.12-0.28)

Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given scant
attention.
D

NASA KSC: Housekeeping, area cleaning
NASA KSC: Bonding Tile Cleaning
NASA KSC: Thermal Blanket Installation

0.09
(0.06-0.13)

Routine, highly-practiced, rapid task involving
relatively low level of skill.
E

NASA KSC: Cleaning a GSE cover or panel
NASA KSC: Torque or tighten GSE cover
NASA KSC: GSE connector mates*
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0.02
(0.007-0.045)

Letter

F

G

H

Nominal HEP
(5th-95th percentile)
Restore or shift a system to original or new state following
0.003
procedures with some checking.
(0.0008-0.007)
NASA KSC: Return to print Problem Report (PR),
Material Review (MR) Repair, and Non-conformance
(N/C) repair.
NASA KSC: Ordnance installation, requiring electrical
check prior to installation
Generic Task

Completely familiar, well-designed, highly practiced
routine task occurring several times per hour, performed to
highest possible standards by highly-motivated, highlytrained and experienced person, totally aware of
implication of failure, with time to correct potential error,
but without the benefit of significant jobs aids.
NASA KSC: Area access Monitor for confined space.
NASA KSC: Physical aid, payload blanket installations*

0.0004
(0.0008-0.009)

Respond correctly to system command even when there is
an augmented or automated supervisory system providing
accurate interpretation of system stage.
0.00002
(0.000006-0.0009)
NASA KSC: System State Alarm or Alert
NASA KSC: Automated Alarm for improper switch
activation

HFACS Method
The SME modified NASA KSC HFACS examples of Human Error Contributing Factors
for all four levels of the HFACS are provided in Tables 22, 23 24 and 25.
The SMEs independently reviewed, analyzed and modified the HFACS four levels of
human error selected examples of “Unsafe acts”, “Preconditions of unsafe acts”, “Unsafe
supervision”, and “Organizational Influences” provided in the Literature Review of this research.
These modified levels were used to categorize the historical KSC Ground Processing
Operations Mishaps.
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Table 22: NASA KSC SME Modified Selected examples of HFACS Preconditions of Unsafe Acts (not an
exhaustive list) (Shappell, 2012)

Condition of Operators
Adverse Mental State

Personnel Factors
Crew Resource Management

Loss of situational awareness

Failed to conduct
adequate
adequate
brief brief
briefbrief
Lack of teamwork
Lack of assertiveness

Complacency
Stress

Poor communication/coordination with
and between tasks.

Overconfidence

Mental fatigue
Circadian dysrhythmia

Misinterpretation of procedures and
processes
Failure of Leadership
Personal Readiness
Failure to adhere to crew rest
requirements
Inadequate training
Self-medication

Channelized attention

Overexertion while off duty

Distraction
Adverse Physiological State
Medical Illness
Acrophobia
Physical fatigue
Intoxication
Effects of Over the Counter (OTC)
mediations
Physical/Mental Limitations

Poor dietary practices
Pattern of poor risk judgment
Environmental Factors
Physical Environment
Weather
Altitude
Terrain

Visual Limitations

Vibration

Insufficient reaction time

Confined Space

Information overload

Toxins in the Hazardous Areas

Inadequate experience for complexity of
situation

Technological Environment

Incompatible physical capabilities

Equipment/controls design

Poor situational awareness
Task Saturation
Alertness (Drowsiness)
Get-Home-Itis

Lighting

89

Lack of sensory input

Checklist layout
Display/interface characteristics

Table 23: NASA KSC SME Modified Selected Examples of Unsafe Acts of Operators (not an exhaustive list)
(Shappell, 2012)

Errors
Skilled Based Errors

Violations
Routine Violations

Breakdown in visual scan

Inadequate briefing for operations

Inadvertent action

Failed to use area access control

Poor technique/preparation
Inadvertent switch management

Flew an unauthorized approach
Violated rules
Failed Visual Flight Rules (VFR) in
marginal weather conditions

Bypass checklist item
Omitted step in procedure
Over-reliance on automation
Failed to prioritize attention
Task overload
Negative habit
Failure to see and avoid
Distraction
Decision Errors
Inappropriate action/not per
procedure
Inadequate knowledge of systems,
procedures
Exceeded ability
Wrong response to emergency
Perceptual Errors
Due to visual illusion
Due to spatial disorientation/vertigo
Due to misjudged distance, altitude,
airspeed, clearance

Failed to comply with procedures and
processes
Violation of orders, regulations,
Standard Operating Procedures
Failed to inspect vehicle after in flight
anomalies
Exceptional Violations
Performed unauthorized acrobatic
maneuver
Improper task technique
Failed to obtain valid weather brief
Exceeded specified limits
Failed to complete procedure steps
Accepted unnecessary hazard
Not current/qualified for task

90

Table 24: NASA KSC SME Modified Selected examples of Preconditions of Unsafe Supervision
(not an exhaustive list) (Shappell, 2012)

Inadequate Supervision
Failed to provide proper training

Failed to Correct a Known Problem
Failed to correct inappropriate
behavior

Failed to provide professional
guidance/oversight
Failed to provide current
publication/adequate technical data
and/or procedures

Failed to identify risky behavior
Failed to correct a safety hazard

Failed to provide adequate rest period

Failed to initiate corrective action

Perceived lack of authority

Failed to stop work due to
safety/hazard concern
Failed to report unsafe tendencies

Failed to track qualifications

Supervisory Violations

Failed to provide operational doctrine

Failed to ensure qualified crew task
(e.g. repair, inspection)

Failed to track performance

Failed to enforce rules and regulations

Over-tasked/untrained supervisor

Fraudulent documentation

Lack of accountability

Loss of supervisory situational
awareness
Planned Inappropriate Operations

Failed to enforce rules and regulations
Violated procedures

Poor crew pairing

Authorized unnecessary hazard

Failed to provide adequate brief time
/supervision
Risk outweighs benefit
Failed to provide adequate
opportunity for crew rest

Willful disregard for authority by
supervisors
Inadequate documentation

Excessive tasking/workload
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Table 25: NASA KSC SME Modified Selected examples of Organization Influences (not an exhaustive list)
(Shappell, 2012)

Resource Management
Human resources
Selection

Organizational Process
Operations
Operational tempo

Staffing/manning

Incentives

Training
Background checks

Quotas
Time pressure

Monetary/Budget Resources

Schedules

Excessive cost cutting

Procedures

Lack of funding

Performance standards

Equipment/Facility Resources

Clearly defined objectives

Poor access

Procedures/instructions about
procedures

Purchasing of unsuitable equipment

Organizational Climate

Failure to correct known design flaws
(e.g. Operational Procedure
workaround, EOs to follow that
never get updated, etc.)
Organizational Process Oversight
Established safety programs/risk
management programs
Management's monitoring and check
of resources, climate and process at
ensure a safe work environment.

Structure
Chain of command
Communication
Accessibility/visibility of supervisor

Organizations Climate Culture

Delegation of authority

Excessive Task Loading

Formal accountability for actions

Organization customs

Polices

Values, beliefs, attitudes

Promotion

Norms and rules

Hiring, firing, retention
Drugs and alcohol
Accident investigations
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Surveys
Survey subjects were asked to evaluate three (3) NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations
Scenarios involving the VAB, OPFs and Pads A/B. The table below (Table 26) was used as a Likert
survey scale for the subjects to provide an Assessment of Affect (AOA) value based on the Error
Producing Conditions identified for the Scenarios.
Table 26 is a modified Aggregate Risk Value table from a previous study. The table was
modified for the Assessment of Affect (AOA) percentage range, proportions of affect and their
descriptions (McCauley-Bell and Baiduru, 1996).
The subjects’ assessment was based on the level of affect an Error Producing Condition (EPC)
has on a specific Ground Processing Operations task (very low, low, moderate, high, and very high).
The values were used to determine the Human Error Probability of those tasks.
Survey data for this research was collected on the NASA KSC site via hard copies. The pool
of employee candidates were strategically selected from their years of experience in NASA Launch
Vehicle Ground Processing Operations, Human Factors background, Mishap Control Board
experience, Engineering, Safety and Mission Assurance, and “on the floor” Technicians
A power and sample size for a Paired t Test was used for the survey sample size
determination. Due to the fact that there are no past research studies with HEART Assessment
proportion of Affects (AOA) for complex systems, a conventional statistical significance value of
α = .05, power of .80 (Cohen,1992), and a standard deviation 0.5 was used for this research.
The result of the Power curve for Paired t test, indicated a minimum sample size of eighteen
(18) participants.
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Figure 11: Power Curve for Paired t Test

Table 26: Assessment of Affect (AOA) Range Table (McCauley-Bell & Baiduru, 1996)

Percentage Range
(Median)

Proportions of
Affect

Description

(.10)
0.00 – 0.20

Very Low Affect

Human error is very unlikely to occur.
Strong Controls may be in place.

(.305)
0.21 – 0.40

Low Affect

Human Error is not likely to occur.
Controls have minor limitations and uncertainties.

(0.510)
0.41 - 0.60

Moderate Affect

Human Error may occur.
Controls exist with some uncertainties.

(0.7)
0.61 - 0.80

High Affect

Human Error is highly likely to occur.
Controls have significant uncertainties.

(0.9)
0.81 – 1.00

Very High Affect

Human Error is certain to occur.
Controls have little to no affect.
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Quantitative Study
Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) Data Analysis
As stated in the Preliminary Analysis chapter, Survey subjects will provide their
subjective Assessed Proportion of Affect (AOA) to help determine the negative affect each Error
Producing Condition (EPC) has on the tasks performed during the three (3) Scenarios. This data
was collected and used to calculate the Human Error Probability for each Scenario question.

Determining the AOA involves providing a percentage rating between 0 and 1 (0.0
representing 0% of the maximum EPC effect and 1 representing 100% of the maximum EPC
effect) for each EPC. The ratings offered are based upon the subjective judgment of the SMEs
and survey subjects involved (Stanton, 2013).
To determine if there is a statistical difference between the AOA values generated by the
SMEs, an ANOVA test on the mean values for the AOAs was used. This test was performed to
compare the mean values of the Assessed Proportion of Affect (AOA) values generated by the
Survey Subjects.
The null hypothesis is that all AOA means are equal and the null alternative is that at
least 1 mean is not equal.
H0: µ AOA 1 = µ AOA 2 = µ AOA 3 = µ AOA 4, etc.
H1: At least 1 not equal.
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Calculating the Human Error Probability for GPO Tasks using the HEART method
HEART Process for Experiment (Williams, 1988)
1. The full range of sub-tasks that a human operator would be required to complete within
in a given task were identified. During the Preliminary process, tasks were identified
from the three (3) scenarios (VAB, OPFs and Pad A/B).
2. The tasks were then classified into the generic tasks provided within the HEART
process with proposed nominal human unreliability for these tasks. These are the
nominal Human Error Probability (HEP) scores for the particular task with calculated
5th – 95th percentage bounds (see Table 21). Specific details to these generic task
categories were determined by consulting local subject matter experts (SMEs).
3. The obvious EPCs that had a high possibility or probability to have a negative effect
on a particular situation was considered. This indicated that the EPCs with the greatest
negative impact are the EPCs that need to be addressed for risk reduction and
mitigation.

The EPCs identified was also compared to the equivalent HFACS

conditions.
4. The Assessed Proportion of Affect (AOA) for each task was determined by SME
Survey Participants (aka subjects), in which the affect proportions ranged from 0 to 1.
The AOA is a subjective assessment of the Error Producing Condition’s (EPC) affect
or impact on a specified Generic Task. The AOA Table range (Table 26) represents
the percentage of this affect (e.g. 0.1 = 10% of the EPC maximum effect). This value
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was a part of the assessed effect for each error producing condition of the given task.
This was established in the survey given to the SMEs.
5. A final HEP was then calculated, by multiplying the HEART nominal HEP of the

task by each of the calculated assessed effects. The calculated effect was determined
below:
(3)

𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
= ((𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 − 1) × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡) + 1
𝐻𝐸𝑃 = (𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)
× (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑠))
6. From here a HEP value can identified the EPCs that cause a higher probability for
an error to occur and possible remedial strategies to minimize the risk of future
human error occurrence.
HEART HEP Calculation Example
Below is an example of calculating the HEP using the HEART method. The AOA is what
affect EPCs #1 and #2 (Unfamiliarity and Time Pressure) have on Generic Task F (Restore/Shift
to original/new state following procedures, with some checking). The AOA ranges from 0.0 to
1.0, in which the 0.0 represents a 0% affect and the 1.0 represents a 100% affect.
Table 27: HEART Calculation Example (Kirwan, 1996)

EPC

Maximum Effect

Assessed Proportion of
Assessed Factor – Calculation
Affect

Unfamiliarity
X 17
0.1
((17-1)0.1) + 1 = 2.6
Inexperience
Time
Pressure
X 11
0.3
((11-1)0.3) +1 = 4.0
Technique
HEP = 0.003 (Task type F probability) x 2.6 x 4.0 = 0.03
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(4)

𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
= ((𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 − 1) × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡) + 1
𝐻𝐸𝑃 = (𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) × (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑠))
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) Data Analysis
Binary Logistics Regression
To identify the significant factors that contributed to human error related Ground
Processing Operations mishaps, a binary logistic regression was used for the statistical analysis
approach. From the binary logistics regression method, significant factors were identified and a
regression model created and evaluated in order to determine its validity. The regression model
was be analyzed to determine if the model is adequate.
The binary logistics regression dependent variable was the Mishap, with Mishaps (Type B,
C, D or incident) equaling a value of 1 and Close Calls equaling a value of 0.
Y, was the binary response variable, presence or absence of a mishap
Y = 1 if a Mishap/Incident occurred
Y = 0 if a Close Call occurred
X = (X1, X2, X3, …..Xk)
The p value results (less than 0.05) from the binary logistic regression results was analyzed
to determine the significant factors contributing to the human error mishaps during ground
processing operations. The Goodness-of-Fit test was assessed to determine how effective the
model is.
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Simple Linear Regression (Probabilistic) Model
(5)

𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥 + 𝜀

y: dependent variable
β0: interception at y axis
β1: Line gradient
x: Predictor variable, independent variable
𝜀 : Error
x predicts y
Mean value of y, for a given value of x
(6)

𝐸(𝑌\𝑥) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥
In this equation, the Y represents the outcome variable, the x represents the value of the
independent variable, and the β represents the model parameters.
Binary Logistic Regression Model equations
The equation below is probability the outcome will occur (e.g. mishaps) is:
(7)

𝑝̂
ln (
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥
1 − 𝑝̂
Or

(8)

exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥)
𝑒 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥
𝑝̂ =
=
1 + exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥)
1 + 𝑒 𝛽0+ 𝛽1 𝑥
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The probability of the outcome not occurring is:
(9)

1 − 𝑝̂ =

1
1 + exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥)

Once the various HFACS sub-preconditions were classified, a binary logistics table was
generated for the year and the occurrence of the error producing conditions. Below is an example
chart of the collected data.
Binary Logistics Table (Example only)
Y = 1 or 0
X1 = Physical Environment (Lighting)
X2 = Adverse Mental State (Get Home It-is)
X3 = Adverse Physiological States (Physical Fatigue)
X4 = Skilled Based Error (Distraction)
X5 = Skilled Based Error (Task Overload)
X6 = Failure to Correct a Known Problem (Failed to initiate corrective action)
X7 = Failure to Correct a Known Problem (Failure to correct safety hazard)
X8 = Supervisory Violation (Failed to enforce rules and regulations)
X9 = Planned Inappropriate Operations (Poor Crew Planning)
X10 = Equipment/Facility Resources (Poor Access)
X11 = Organizational Process (Time Pressure)
X12 = Resource Management (Staffing/Manning)
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Table 28: Example of Binary Logistics Table for Statistical Analysis

Year

X1

MISHAP/
CLOSE
CALL

Preconditions of
Unsafe Acts

Unsafe Supervision

Organizational
Influences

X2

X3

X4

X5

X6

X7

X8

X9

X10

X11

X12

Y

Unsafe Acts

1985

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

1986

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1987

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1988

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

1989

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1990

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1991

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

1992

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

1993

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

2013

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

2014

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Data Analysis - Validation
Triangulation
Triangulation, which is defined as “cross checking” information and conclusions
through multiple procedures of sources, data and research methods (Johnson, 1997), was used
for model validation.
The binary logistics regression model was used to analyze contributing factors to Mishap
occurrence and was compared to the results of the Human Error Probability (HEP) values
calculated from the HEART methodology.
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As a secondary comparison for the HEART Human Error Probability (HEP) values,
an ANOVA One-Way test and repeated measures of data was performed to compare the mean
values of the Assessed Proportion of Affect (AOA) values generated by the SMEs.
The binary logistic regression model “Goodness-to-Fit” tests, “Odds Ratios” and “Binary
Fitted plots” was analyzed to determine if the model is adequate.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Summary
This chapter provides an overview of the research question, hypothesis and discusses the
research findings and results.
Using the HFACS tool to categorize the Ground Processing Operations (GPO) human error
related mishaps from October 1984 – May 2014, two binary logistics regression models were
generated. The first binary logistics regression model with eight (8) categorized human error
contributing factors, identified two (2) as significant factors (perceptual error and decision based
error). To simplify the model, the binary logistics regression analysis was performed again with
stepwise backward elimination. As a result, four (4) human error contributing factors were
identified as statistically significant (skilled based error, perceptual error, decision based error, and
exceptional violation).
The Goodness-to-Fit tests, Odds Ratios, and Main Effect Plots in both Regression models,
all indicated that they were good models. Predicted probabilities were calculated from both
generated binary logistics regression model equations. The predicted probabilities calculated the
probability of a mishap for each contributing factor’s occurrence, in which a “1” indicated an
occurrence and a “0” indicated a nonoccurrence of that event.
These predicted values were compared and confirmed as consistent with related Mishap
literature reviews and research performed in similar fields, such as the Aviation and Aeronautics
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industry. Generated Binary Fitted Plots from the regression analysis also confirmed and validated
the predicted probabilities.
The HEART Method was also used to calculate predicted Human Error Probabilities
(HEP). The HEART HEP values generated from the survey data identified “Physical Limitations”
related Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) as the contributors to the highest Human Error
Probabilities (22% - 26%). In comparison, this is also in line with the predicted probably of 33%
from the HFACS binary logistics regression model (see Table 29) for “Physical Environment”
Contributing Factors (e.g. Confined Space).
Together these two methods were used to determine predicted human error probability
within NASA Ground Processing Operations (GPOs), in order to identify areas that need
attention for mitigating future potential Mishap occurrences.
The remainder of this chapter will explain the process and predicated probabilities that
were generated, provide information on the survey results and demographics of the survey
participants.
HFACS Human Error Probability Results and Analysis
Binary Logistics Regression Model Results
In this research, binary logistics regression was used to analyze contributing factors to
Mishap occurrence.
The p value results from the binary logistic regression results were analyzed to determine
the significant factors contributing to the human error mishaps during ground processing
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operations. The Goodness-to-Fit tests were assessed to determine how good the model was.
When performing the binary logistics regression analysis, the occurrence of a Mishap
(represented by and “0” or “1”) was identified as the “response” and “response event.” Each of
the HFACS sub level categories from the HFACS four levels of human failure were selected as
categorical (non-continuous) predictors. However, when entering all 19 categorical predictors into
Minitab for the binary logistic regression model, an error was generated, due to the requirement
that the categorical predictors must have more than one distinct value. Subsequently, eleven (11)
sublevel categories were removed from the binary regression analysis and classified as having no
significant impact on human error related mishaps during Launch Vehicle ground processing
operations during the recorded data time period. This was due to the fact that there were no events
for eleven (11) of the HFACS factors.
Performing the regression analysis generated a model in which the predicted probability of
each occurrence was calculated. Below are the HFACS regression model values. Three Goodnessof-Fit tests were performed in this analysis: Deviance, Pearson and Hosmer-Lemeshow.
The Deviance and Pearson Goodness-of-Fit models assess the discrepancy between the
current model and full model.

The Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit test compares the

observed expected frequencies of events and non-events to assess how well the model fits the data.
For this analysis the Deviance p value is 0.723, Pearson p value is 0.380 and the HosmerLemeshow p value is 0.897. For all three Goodness-to-Fit tests the p values are greater than 0.05,
indicating there is no significant deviation and the model fits the data.
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Table 29: Identified HFACS Regression Model Values

HFACS Human Error Factor
Skilled Based
Decision Based
Perceptual Errors
Routine Violation
Exceptional Violation
Crew Resource Management
Physical Environment
Supervisory Violation

Fitted
Probability
27%
41%
47%
9%
36%
14%
33%
24%

P value

Odds
Ratio

0.070
0.037
0.009
0.444
0.052
0.283
0.138
0.226

10.15
18.72
24.25
2.67
15.67
4.38
13.72
8.61

Beta
Coefficient
(N=414)

β0 = -3.31
β1 = 2.32
β2 = 2.93
β3 = 3.20
β4 = 0.98
β5 = 2.75
β6 = 1.48
β7 = 2.62
β8 = 2.15

Binary Logistics Regression Model with Stepwise Backward Elimination
For the original binary logistics expression in this research all factors with events were
used. In an effort to simplify the model, Stepwise Backward elimination was used. Backward
elimination, is a process that begins with all candidate variables, then tests the deletion of each
variable using a selected model comparison criterion. This deleting process is repeated, until no
further improvement is possible (Fox, 2015). Below are the results from the backward elimination
process.
For the Beta coefficients of the regression model, the constant (which is the β0) is -2.242
and the HFACS Human Error factor Beta coefficients (βx) are: Skill Based β1 = 1.264, Decision
Based β2 = 1.887, Perceptual Errors β3 = 2.335, Exceptional Violation β4 = 1.682.
For the factors in this regression model, the p values are: Skilled Based p = 0.000, Decision
Based p = 0.005, Perceptual Errors p = 0.000, Exceptional Violation p = 0.013. From the p values,
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the Skilled Based Error, Decision Based Error, Perceptual Error and Exceptional Violation p
values are < 0.05, thus all statistically significant.
Table 30: Identified HFACS Regression Model with Backward Elimination P Values and Beta Coefficients

Beta
Coefficient
(N=414)
HFACS Human Error Factor
Skilled Based

P value
0.000

Decision Based

0.005

Perceptual Error

0.000

Exceptional Violation

0.013

β0 = -2.242
β1 = 1.264
β2 = 1.887
β3 = 2.335
β4 = 1.682

For the Odds Ratio, each Human Error Factor Beta coefficient indicates that for each
additional occurrence of a HFACS Human Error factor, the odds of this measurement falling into
the “1” category (which represents a Mishap/Incident Occurrence), increases by that value. This
value is derived by calculating the exponential of the Beta Coefficient. So, for the Skilled Based
Error β1, the additional occurrence on this factor increases the odds of a mishap/incident
occurrence by 3.54 (e1.264 = 3.54). The odds ratios for β1 through β4 are: Skilled Based 3.54,
Decision Based 6.60, Perceptual Errors 10.33, and Exceptional Violation 5.38.

Table 31: HFACS Regression Model with Backward Elimination Odds Ratio

HFACS Human Error Factor
Perceptual Errors

Odds
Ratio
10.33

Decision Based

6.60

Exceptional Violation

5.38

Skilled Based

3.54
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Of these odds ratios, the highest values rank from Perceptual Errors at 10.33, followed by Decision
Based Errors at 6.60, Exceptional Violations at 5.38, and Skilled Based at 3.54, in which they are
all statistically significant.
Goodness-of-Fit Tests
For all three Goodness-to-Fit tests, the p value was greater than 0.05, indicating that we
want to reject the null hypotheses (H0), which states H0: Contributing factors: unsafe acts of
operators, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and/or organizational influences
(multiple causes) do not have an impact on human error events (i.e. mishaps, close calls, incident
or accidents) in NASA ground processing operations. This indicates that there is no significant
deviation and the model fits the data.
Table 32: HFACS Goodness-of-Fit Tests with Backward Elimination P Values

Goodness-of-Fit tests
Deviance

P value
0.725

Pearson

0.458

Hosmer-Lemeshow

0.795

Binary Fitted Plots
The Binary Fitted Line Plots for each Human Error Factor are listed below. From the plot
observations, the x axis displays the impact of error an occurrence (either “0” indicating no
occurrence, or “1” indicating an occurrence). The Y-axis displays the Probability of a Mishap
Event occurrence. All of the observations (which are represented by the blue dots) have a
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probability of either a “1” indicating a Mishap occurred or “0” a Mishaps did not occur. The
burgundy line on the graph reveals the probability that a mishap will occur based on the type of
human error factor manifested. From the Skilled Based Error Binary Fitted Plot it is observed that
when a Skilled Based Error occurs (1), there is about a 25% probability of a Mishap occurrence,
around 40% for Decision Based, 50% for Perceptual Errors and 35% for Exceptional Violation.

Figure 12: Binary Fitted Line Plots

109

Prediction from the Regression Model
The Binary Logistic Regression Expression for this Model is P (1) = e (Y’) / (1 + e (Y’)), with the Yˊ
equal to:
(10)

𝑌 ′ = −2.242 + 1.264 𝛽1 (𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑) + 1.887 𝛽2 (𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑)
+ 2.335 𝛽3 (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠) + 1.682 𝛽4 (𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠)
In order to use this model for probability prediction, the occurrence of human error events
are entered into the equation. Using the model equation, which is the same as Equation 8 for
calculating the binary regression model probability we have:
(11)

exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥)
𝑒 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥
𝑝̂ =
=
1 + exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥)
1 + 𝑒𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥
=

𝑒 −2.242+ 1.264 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑+1.887 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑+⋯+1.682 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙
1 + 𝑒 −2.242+ 1.264 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑+1.887 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑+⋯+1.682 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙

To predict the probability of a Mishap occurrence based on the HFACS Human Error Factor
“Skilled Based” occurrence (1), the following values were entered into the Equation.
Table 33: HFACS Factor with Backward Elimination Binary X Values

HFACS Factor
Skilled Based
Decision Based
Perceptual Errors
Exceptional Violation
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1
0
0
0

X Values
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
1

Table 34: Binary Logistics Regression with Backward Elimination Prediction Y for given X value

Logistic Regression with Backward Elimination Prediction Y for given X Value

X-Variables
Intercept
Skilled Based
Decision Based
Perceptual Errors
Exceptional Violation

Coefficients
-2.242
1.264
1.887
2.335
1.682

X-values
(For: Skilled
Based)

1
1
0
0
0

Product
-2.242
1.264
0
0
0
log(p/(1-p)) = Sum of

-0.978 products in column

0.273288808

Probability Formula =
exp(-0.978)/(1+exp(0.978))

27%

The Remaining Probability Values were calculated and are in Table 35 below. When comparing
the calculated Fitted Probability, the values are consistent with the Binary Fitted Line Plots.

Table 35: Identified HFACS Regression Model Fitted Probability with Backward Elimination Values

SE
(Standard
Error) Fit
HFACS Factor
Skilled Based
Decision Based
Perceptual Errors
Exceptional Violation

Fitted
Probability
27%
41%
52%
36%
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3%
15%
13%
15%

Lower 95%
Confidence
Interval

21%
17%
29%
14%

Higher
95%
Confidence
Interval
34%
71%
75%
66%

HFACS Factorial Plots
Figure 13 displays the main effects plots for this research’s mishaps/incidents data. When
analyzing the slopes of the main effects plots, the slope indicates the presence and significance of
a main effect. The more the slope line is non horizontal, the more of a main effect is present. The
greater the difference in the positions of the plotted point, indicates the greater the significance of
the main effect. The Skilled based, Decision based, Perceptual and Exceptional Errors have strong
(non-parallel to the x axis) slopes, low p values and a range of 27% - 52% probability of mishap
occurrence when present, etc. This indicates that as the Human Error event increases, the
probability of the mishap event increases.

Main Effects Plot for Mishap/Incidents
Fitted Probabilities

Skilled Based

Probability of 1

1.000

Decision Based

Perceptual Errors

Exceptional

0.995

0.990

0.985
0

1

0

1

0

1

0

Figure 13: Main Effects Plot for Mishap/Incidents with Backward Elimination
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1

Participant Survey Results
For this research survey, the subjects were asked to answer a total of 21 questions. Of the 21
questions, they were asked to evaluate and answer 18 questions from 3 NASA Launch Vehicle
Ground Processing Operations Scenarios involving the VAB, OPFs and Pads A/B. There were a
total of 41 survey participants. Table 26 was used as a survey scale for the subjects to provide an
Assessment of Affect (AOA) value based on the Error Producing Conditions identified for the
Scenarios. The subjects were asked to provide their assessment based on the level of affect an Error
Producing Condition (EPC) may have on a specific Ground Processing Operations task (very low,
low, moderate, high, and very high).
Below are graphs depicting the survey participants’ job function titles, years/experience
working at the Kennedy Space Center, and their years/experience working in Ground Processing
Operations (GPO). Survey participant #39 did not record their demographic data on their survey,
so it was removed from the years at KSC and in GPO line graphs. The survey participants’ average
years working at KSC is 23.9875 years and their average years working at KSC supporting Ground
Processing Operations is: 19.8125 years.
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SURVEY PARTICIPANTS' JOB FUNCTION
Unidentified
2%

Human Factors
Modeling, QAS and
Safety Specialist
2%
Technican
27%

Quality Assurance
Specialist (QAS)
42%
Quality
Engineer/Systems
Engineer
2%
QAS and Safety
Specialist
15%

Inspector (Quality
Control)
10%

Figure 14: Survey Participants’ Job Function
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Survey Participants' Years at KSC - Avg 23.9875
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Survey Participants' Years in KSC GPO - Avg. 19.8125
35
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Figure 15: Survey Participants’ Years at NASA KSC and KSC GPO
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HEART Human Error Probability (HEP) Results
Below in Table 36 are the values and Assessed Proportion of Affects (AOA) generated by
the survey participants to calculate the Human Error Probability (HEP).

Table 36: HEART Survey Participants Assessed Proportion of Affect (AOA)

Survey
Question
Number

Scenarios

Generic
Task,
HEART
Nominal
HEPs
(Table
21)

Error Producing
Conditions

HEART
EPC(s)
(Table 9)

Survey
Participant’s
Average
Assessment
(AOA)

4

VAB - Scenario 1

C

Tiredness – Long hours – 3rd
Shift.

35

5

VAB - Scenario 1

C

Accessibility limitations.

22

6

VAB - Scenario 1

C

Poor lighting.

33

7

VAB - Scenario 2

C

Heat (Orbiter lifting required
doors to be closed and
coveralls worn).

27

0.421711

8

VAB - Scenario 2

C

Heights, climbing ladders to
access platforms.

27

0.397179

9

VAB - Scenario 2

C

Tripping hazards.

33

10

OPF - Scenario 1

E

Accessibility limitations –
Crawling around on wires
bundle.

11

OPF - Scenario 1

E

Physical Stress - twisting and
turning.

27

5, 22, 38

12

OPF - Scenario 1

E

Confined working space breakable parts in or on way
to/from work area (air ducts,
phenolic brackets, tubing).

13

OPF - Scenario 2

F

Claustrophobia.
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22, 27

27

0.55641026
0.495
0.529872

0.463077
0.62561

0.538902

0.597195

0.603125

Survey
Question
Number

14

15

Scenarios

OPF - Scenario 2

OPF - Scenario 2

Generic
Task,
HEART
Nominal
HEPs
(Table
21)

Error Producing
Conditions

HEART
EPC(s)
(Table 9)

F

Physical Stress - twisting and
turning.

27

F

Confined working space Accessing and backing out of
small tight areas with; wire
harnesses, tubing, and struts.

5, 22, 38

0.58475

5, 22, 27

0.529146

3

0.412683

13, 27, 33

0.552439

16

Pad A/B - Scenario
1

F

Confined working space accessibility limitations;
crawling and climbing
around/near; wiring
bundles/connectors,
hydraulic/pneumatic lines, air
ducts, etc. Physical stress twisting and turning.

17

Pad A/B - Scenario
1

F

Noise (air purge).

18

Pad A/B - Scenario
1

F

Poor lighting.

19

Pad A/B - Scenario
2

C

Accessibility limitations –
when open below, required to
wear safety harness and
lanyard.

20

Pad A/B - Scenario
2

C

Physical stress due to
installing vertically.

21

Pad A/B - Scenario
2

C

Tiredness – 3rd Shift Work.
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22

Survey
Participant’s
Average
Assessment
(AOA)

0.529

0.47622

22, 27

0.448205

35

0.573415

Of the Human Error Probability (HEP) values calculated from the surveys, there were three
values that had the highest probability. The HEP values were from survey questions 5, 19, and 20,
which all had a probability above 20%. These three questions and their scenario are below.
VAB Scenario 1
Task: Performing Booster Hold-down Posts
Subtasks
Arming the Booster
Connecting the Booster Segments
Installing Safety Wires

Error Producing Conditions
Tiredness – Long hours – 3rd Shift.
Accessibility limitations.
Poor lighting.

Question 5: What proportion of affect would “Accessibility Limitations” affect performing Booster
Hold-down Posts and any of its Subtasks?
Pad A/B - Scenario 2
Task: Installing Engines at Pad
Subtasks
Installing and torqueing hardware
Connecting lines (inspect, clean, install seals,
hardware install and torque)
Electrical connects

Error Producing Conditions
Accessibility limitations –when open below,
required to wear safety harness and lanyard.
Physical stress due to installing vertically.
Tiredness – 3rd Shift Work.

Question 19: What proportion of affect would “Accessibility limitations –when open below, required
to wear safety harness and lanyard” affect performing the Installation of Engines at the Pad and any of
its Subtasks?
Question 20: What proportion of affect would “Physical stress due to installing vertically”
affect performing the Installation of Engines at the Pad and any of its Subtasks?
Figure 16: HEART Survey Questions with Highest Human Error Probabilities (HEPs)
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Within these three questions with the highest HEP value, there is a commonality between
them.

Each of the questions have error producing conditions that deal with accessibility

limitations, physical stress and tiredness. Poor lighting deals with the physical environment
contributing factor.
Table 37: HEART Survey Calculated Human Error Probabilities (HEPs)

4

EPC(s)
(Table
9)
35

5

Survey
Question

Max.
Effect
#1

Max.
Effect
#2

Max.
Effect
#3

Assessed
Proportion
of Affect
(average)

Assessed
Factor –
Calc. #1

Assessed
Factor –
Calc. #2

Assessed
Factor –
Calc. #3

Generic
Task,
HEART
Nominal
Human
Error
Prob.
(HEPs)
(Table 21)
C

Generic
Task,
HEART
Nominal
Human
Error
Prob.
Value
(HEPs)
(Table 21)
0.16

HEP
%

1.1

0.556410

1.055641

22

1.8

0.495

1.396

C

0.16

22%

6

33

1.15

0.529872

1.079481

C

0.16

17%

7

27

1.4

0.421711

1.168684

C

0.16

19%

8

27

1.4

0.397179

1.158872

C

0.16

19%

9

33

1.15

0.463077

1.069462

C

0.16

17%

10

22, 27

1.500488

E

0.02

4%

11

27
5, 22,
38
27

E

0.02

2%

E

0.02

1.24125

F

0.003

0%

0.529

1.2116

F

0.003

0%

0.58475

5.678

1.4678

F

0.003

0.529146

5.233168

1.423317

F

0.003

F

0.003

F

0.003

12
13

1.8

0.538902

1.2155608

9

0.597195

5.77756

1.4
1.4

1.8

20

22
22, 27

21

35

1.1

15
16
17
18
19

0.62561

1.4

27
5, 22,
38
5, 22,
27
3
13, 27,
33

14

1.4

0.603125

9

1.8

9

1.8

1.4

10
4
1.8

1.4
1.4

1.15

1.250244

1.211658

17%

12%

3%
3%

0.412683

4.714147

0.552439

2.657317

0.47622

1.380976

C

0.16

22%

0.448205

1.358564

C

0.16

26%

0.573415

1.057342

C

0.16

17%
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1.220976
1.179282

1.082866

1%
1%

Model Validation
HFACS Model
The HFACS model was verified by consistency and comparison to other research
conducted with the HFACS Classification system and data in the aeronautics field.
Research performed on Human Factors in Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Operations,
conducted a HFACS analysis on 221 Mishaps over a 10 year period (Tvaryanas, 2006). In this
study, the HFACS model was modified specifically for the Department of Defense and was used
to code their mishaps. A binary regression model was created and used for predicting Operator
Error (Tvaryanas, 2006).
Within the Human Factors Remote Pilots Aircraft (RPA) study’s summary of prior RPA
mishap studies, 3 of the 5 studies’ largest percentage of mishaps fell into the “Unsafe Acts”
(Skilled Based, Decision Based, Routine Violation, Exceptional and Perceptual) Category
(Tvaryanas, 2006). This is consistent with the overall percentage levels of HFACS Factor Events
in this study. Figure 17 below shows the percentages of the eight categories that the Ground
Processing Operations Mishaps fell into. The “Unsafe Acts” HFACS categories (Skilled Based,
Decision Based, Routine Violation, Exceptional and Perceptual) comprise the majority of the
Ground Processing Operations Mishaps.
Overall, of the 221 Mishaps reviewed in the RPA Study, 60.2% of the mishaps were
associated with operations-related human causal factors (Tvaryanas, 2006).
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Crew Resource
Management
4%

Physical
Environment
1%

HFACS Human Error Factors Percentage
Supervisory
Violation
0.005%

Decision Based 3%

Skilled Based
46%
Routine Violation
39%

Perceptual
4%

Exceptional
Violation
3%

Figure 17: HFACS Human Error Factors Percentages for KSC GPO

As discussed in the Literature Review chapter, a study of 523 accidents within the Republic
of China (ROC) Air Force from 1978-2002 (24 years), revealed several significant associations
between errors at the operation level and organization inadequacies (Li, W., 2006).
The frequency counts and inter-rater reliability statistics for the Republic of China (ROC)
Air Force’s study were generated for all 523 accidents. Of the four categories and subcategories,
the sublevel errors that had the ten (10) highest frequencies of occurrence (when ranking order of
highest frequency) are in the graphs below, with “Unsafe Acts (Level 1)” and “Preconditions for
unsafe acts (Level 2)” being the leading HFACS Categories.
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When comparing the highest frequency of occurrences between the Republic of China
(ROC) Air Force study and the KSC Ground Processing Operations (GPO) study, the highest
frequencies of occurrence are consistent, due to the majority of human error occurrence falling
within the “Unsafe Acts (Level 1)” and “Preconditions for unsafe acts (Level 2)” HFACS
Categories. Two graphs comparing the studies are presented below.
Level 1: Unsafe Acts (of Operators)
Level 2: Preconditions for unsafe acts (e.g. latent conditions)
Level 3: Unsafe supervision
Level 4: Organization Influences

Republic of China (ROC) Air Force Study Top 10 Frequency
Counts and Inter-rater Reliability (Li, W., 2006).
250
200

226

223
184

184

177

150

160

146
116

100

76

74

50
0
Skilled-Based Errors (Level 1)

Decision Errors (Level 1)

Adverse Mental State (Level 2)

Resource Management (Level 2)

Inadequate Supervision (Level 3)

Violations (Level 1)

Crew Resource Management (Level 2)

Perceptual Errors (Level 1)

Organization Process (Level 4)

Physical environment (Level 2)

Figure 18: Republic of China (ROC) Air Force Study Top 10 Frequency Counts and Inter-rater Reliability
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HFACS KSC GPO Frequency Counts
250
200

192
162

150
100
50

17

16

11

11

3

2

0
Skilled Based (Level 1)

Routine Violations (Level 1)

Crew Resource Management (Level 2)

Perceptual Errors (Level 1)

Exceptional (Level 1)

Decision Based (Level 1)

Physical Environment (Level 2)

Supervisory Violation (Level 3)

Figure 19: HFACS KSC GPO Frequency Counts

In another research study on recurrent error pathways in HFACS Data, the research focused
on an analysis of 95 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Mishaps. In this research, the Perceptional and
Skilled Based Error pathways, which both fall under the HFACS “Unsafe Acts” Level 1, had
common latent failures associated with each other and together were accountable for the majority
of crewmember related mishaps (Tvaryanas, 2008). This result is consistent with the four factors
in this study’s binary logistics regression Stepwise Backward Elimination Model (Skilled Based,
Perceptual Error, Decision Based and Exceptional Violation) in which Skilled Based and
Perceptual Error were the two most statistically significant with a p value of 0.000 (reference Table
36) and with the majority of human error factors identified, which fall under the HFACS “Unsafe
Acts” Level 1.
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Binary Logistics Regression Model
The Goodness-to-Fit tests were within acceptable range for fitting the data. For
both the binary logistics regression equation and equation with backward elimination all
Goodness-to-Fit p values were greater than 0.05. This indicates that there is no significant
deviation and the model fits the data, and indicates to us that we should reject the null hypotheses
(H0), which states Contributing factors: unsafe acts of operators, preconditions for unsafe acts,
unsafe supervision, and/or organizational influences (multiple causes) do not have an impact on
human error events (i.e. mishaps, close calls, incident or accidents) in KSC ground processing
operations.
Survey One-Way ANOVA
In order to determine if there is a statistical difference between the Assessed Proportion of
Affect (AOA) values generated by the survey participants, an ANOVA on the mean values for the
AOAs was used. A One-Way ANOVA was performed to compare the mean values of the
Assessed Proportion of Affect (AOA) values generated by the SMEs.
The null hypothesis is that all AOA means are equal and the null alternative is that at least
1 mean is not equal.
H0: µ AOA 1 = µ AOA 2 = µ AOA 3 = µ AOA 4, etc.
H1: At least 1 not equal.
Based on the One-Way ANOVA performed on the survey data, the p value of 0.00 indicates
that there is a statistically significant difference between the SME’s response to the survey
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questions. With a p value of 0.000, which is less than the 0.05 significance level, the null
hypothesis, which reads: H0: µ AOA 1 = µ AOA 2 = µ AOA 3 = µ AOA 4, etc., is rejected.

One-way ANOVA: Response versus Question
Method
Null hypothesis
Alternative hypothesis
Significance level
Rows unused

All means are equal
At least one mean is different
α = 0.05
18

Equal variances were assumed for the analysis.
Factor Information
Factor
Levels
Question
18
18, 19, 20, 21

Values
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,

Analysis of Variance
Source
Question
Error
Total

DF
17
702
719

Adj SS
3.240
27.659
30.900

Adj MS
0.19061
0.03940

Model Summary
S
R-sq R-sq(adj)
0.198496 10.49%
8.32%
Pooled StDev = 0.198496

F-Value
4.84

P-Value
0.000

R-sq(pred)
5.83%

Figure 20: One-Way ANOVA - Minitab

HEART Human Error Probability (HEP) Validation
The three highest HEP values from the survey data had an “Accessibility Limitations”,
“Physical Stress” and “Tiredness” Error Producing Condition as commonalities between them.
When comparing the EPCs of the HEART method to the NASA KSC Modified Levels of
the HFACS, the HEART EPCs “Accessibility Limitations,” “Physical Stress” and “Tiredness” are
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best matched with HFACS Preconditions of Unsafe Acts sublevels “Physical Environment
Confined Space” and “Adverse Physiological States - Physical Fatigue.”
When reviewing the result values of the Binary Logistics Model (prior to the backward
elimination) Predicted Human Error Probabilities, the “Physical Environment” had a Fitted
Probability of 33%.
There is no correlation between all of the calculated HEART HEP values to all of the
HFACS predicted binary logistics regression values. However, there is some correlation between
the 3 highest HEP values (22%, 22%, and 26%) from the survey data to the Physical Environment
Fitted Probability of 33% from the binary logistics regression (before Backward Elimination) to
draw statistically valid conclusions. Due to survey participants providing their subjective Assessed
Proportion of Affect (AOA) for each EPC, it is difficult to directly compare remaining HEART HEP
values to the remaining HFACS binary logistic regression signification factors.
It can be noted that all of the SMEs contributions to the developed Scenarios, tasks, subtasks
and identified EPCs developed all fall under the HFACS Preconditions of Unsafe Acts Levels
(Physical Environment Factor and Adverse Physiological States). In the Preliminary Analysis of
this study, it was also noted that many of the SMEs stated that they felt one of the biggest influences
to human error mishaps in Ground Processing Operations (GPO) is confined spaces, which is a
physical environment limitation.
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Research Question and Hypothesis Tests/Results
The Research Question and Hypotheses and results are below.
Question 1: What are the identified leading human error causes and contributors to historical Launch
Vehicle Ground Processing Operations mishaps and findings based on past mishaps, near mishaps, and
close calls? Quantifying this data and identifying the leading cause is essential in the research analysis.

Question 1
Both binary regression logistics equations in this study identified leading human error
causes and contributors to the historical Launch Vehicle Ground Processing Operations
mishaps and findings based on past mishaps, near mishaps, and close calls.
The binary logistics regression equation with stepwise backward elimination
(simplified) equation identified the significant causes and contributors as: Skilled Based Errors,
Decision Based Errors, Perceptual Errors, and Exceptional Violations.
Hypothesis 1
H0: Contributing factors: unsafe acts of operators, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision,
and/or organizational influences (multiple causes) do not have an impact on human error events (i.e. mishaps, close
calls, incident or accidents) in NASA ground processing operations.
H1: Contributing factors: unsafe acts of operators, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision,
and/or organizational influences (multiple causes) do have an impact on human error events (i.e. mishaps, close
calls, incident or accidents) in NASA ground processing operations.

127

Hypothesis 1
Results of the Binary Logistics Model provides support that when mishaps are categorized
using the modified NASA KSC HFACS Model, the model does show there are significant
contributing factors to KSC Ground Processing Operations (GPO) Human Error.
The fact that KSC’s GPO related Mishaps were able to be sorted into the HFACS Levels
and sub-categories support the idea that the HFACS tool could be used for complex operations
such as KSC GPOs. Of the four (4) HFACS Levels, the only level that did not have any KSC GPO
mishaps was “Organizational Influences.” This may be due to the difficulty of identifying latent
conditions, which are considered “resident pathogens” that can produce a problem within the
system, and can lie dormant for years before they combine with active failure to create a potential
hazard (Reason, 2000).
The binary logistics regression model Goodness-to-Fit Tests all met the criteria for validity.
For all three Goodness-to-Fit tests the p value was greater than 0.05, indicating that we should
reject the null hypotheses (H0), which states H0: Contributing factors: unsafe acts of operators,
preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and/or organizational influences (multiple
causes) do not have an impact on human error events (i.e. mishaps, close calls, incident or
accidents) in KSC ground processing operations. This indicates that there is no significant
deviation and the model fits the data.
When comparing the HFACS Fitted Probability values to the HEART Human Error
Probability values, there is a similar probability concerning physical limitations (confined space)
for the HFACS Factors and HEART EPCs.
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Therefore, the H0 null Hypothesis is REJECTED. Contributing factors: unsafe acts of
operators, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and/or organizational influences
(multiple causes) DO have an impact on human error events (i.e. mishaps, close calls, incident or
accidents) in KSC ground processing operations.
Hypothesis 2
H0: The HFACS framework conceptual model can be proven to be a viable analysis and classification
system to help classify both latent and active underlying contributors and causes of human error in NASA ground
processing operations.
H1: The HFACS framework conceptual model cannot be proven to be a viable analysis and classification
system to help classify both latent and active underlying contributors and causes of human error in NASA ground
processing operations.

Hypothesis 2
The HFACS framework conceptual model used in this research revealed both active and
latent failures. The majority of the significant contributing factors were from HFACS Levels 1
and 2, which encompass both active and latent failures. Figure 19 shows the frequency count of
KSC Ground Processing Operations Mishaps that were categorized into the HFACS framework.
Tables 29 and 35 show the Human Error underlying contributors and causes based on the
HFACS framework identified with the binary logistics regression equations.
In the model validation of this chapter, the HFACS model was verified by consistency and
comparison to other research conducted with the HFACS Classification system and data in the
aeronautics field.
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Therefore, the H0 null Hypothesis is ACCEPTED. The HFACS framework conceptual
model CAN be proven to be a viable analysis and classification system to help identify both latent
and active underlying contributors and causes of human error in KSC ground processing
operations.
Hypothesis 3
H0: The development of a model using the HEART assessment can be used as a tool to help determine
the probability of human error occurrence in NASA ground processing operations.
H1: The development of a model using the HEART assessment cannot be used as a tool to help determine
the probability of human error occurrence in NASA ground processing operations.

Hypothesis 3
A NASA KSC Specific Modified HEART assessment tool was used to calculate the
Human Error Probability (HEP) based on Assessment of Affect (AOA) values provided by survey
participants with years of experience and a background with NASA KSC Ground Processing
Operations.
Based on the Model Validation section of this research, when comparing the Error
Producing Conditions (EPCs) of the HEART method to the NASA KSC Modified Levels of the
HFACS, the HEART EPCs “Accessibility Limitations,” “Physical Stress” and “Tiredness” are
best matched with HFACS Preconditions of Unsafe Acts sublevels “Physical Environment Confined Space” and “Adverse Physiological States - Physical Fatigue.”
There is no correlation between all of the calculated HEART HEP values to all of the
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HFACS predicted binary logistics regression values. However, between the 3 highest HEART
HEP values (22%, 22% and 26%) from the survey, there is a correlation with the HFACS data for
the Physical Environment Fitted Probability of 33% (which was generated from the binary logistics
regression, before stepwise backward elimination).
It can be noted that from the Preliminary chapter of this Research, the developed Scenarios,
tasks, subtasks and identified EPCs all fall under the HFACS Preconditions of Unsafe Acts Levels
(“Physical Environment” and “Adverse Physiological States” contributing factors). It is also noted
from the Preliminary Analysis of this study that many of the SMEs stated they felt one of the
biggest influences to human error mishaps in Ground Processing Operations (GPO) is confined
spaces, which is a “Physical Environment” limitation.
As a part of the statistical approach, one of the goals of this research was to use the HEART
model to compare the HEP generated values from survey participants’ data to the HFACS
significant factors and predicted probability values. After the surveys were completed and the
HEART HEPs were calculated, there was no correlation to all of the significant factors and
predicted probabilities identified with the HFACS binary logistics regression model, except for the
“Physical Environment” significant factor and its fitted probability of 33%.
There was also no sufficient HEART Human Error Probability (HEP) calculated research
data conducted in relation to the aeronautics or aerospace field for verification through consistency
or comparison.
However, the fact that all of the SME generated HEART Survey Scenarios, tasks, subtasks
and EPCs all fell under the HFACS Preconditions of Unsafe Acts Levels, is consistent with
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previous studies discussed in this research identifying the highest frequency of occurrences and
the majority of human error occurrences falling within the “Unsafe Acts (Level 1)” and
“Preconditions for unsafe acts (Level 2)” HFACS Categories.
The 3rd hypothesis for this research is to determine if the development of a model using the
HEART assessment can be used as a tool to help determine the probability of human error
occurrence in NASA ground processing operations.
After conducting the survey, gathering the data, and calculating the HEART Human Error
Probabilities (HEP), the HEART tool was successful in determining the probability of human error
occurrence from the generated Scenarios.
Therefore the H0 null hypothesis is ACCEPTED due to consistency with related HFACS
aerospace studies identifying the majority of human error occurrences falling with the “Unsafe
Acts” and “Preconditions of Unsafe Acts” categories.

The development of a model using the

HEART assessment CAN be used as a tool to help determine the probability of human error
occurrence in NASA ground processing operations.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
Research Summary
Chapter 1: This established the context and motivation for this research.
The goal was to also develop a sound model from an ergonomic, mathematical and human
factors standpoint and to add to the body of knowledge in the area of human factors, by providing
ergonomic and mathematical results from the Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique
(HEART) and Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) tools.
Chapter 2: Research shows through a literature review that statistically human error is
identified as the leading primary cause of aviation, mining and other mishaps. Unfortunately, most
incident reports are not designed around a theoretical framework of human error. In this research,
it was important that human factor issues were addressed and a comparative analysis of existing
databases be conducted to determine the human factors responsible for the failures, mishaps, etc.
(Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001).
Chapter 3: A preliminary analysis was performed by SMEs to modify the HEART Generic
Tasks and the HFACS four levels of human error to be more in line with NASA KSC Ground
Processing Operations. The SMEs also played a significant role in the development of the six (6)
scenarios that were used for the HEART Survey, which identified the Tasks, Sub-tasks and Error
Producing Conditions (EPCs) used for assessing the EPCs’ affect on NASA Ground Processing
Operations tasks.
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Chapter 4: Initial data was collected from recorded NASA KSC Mishap Data from October
1984 – May 2014. Launch Vehicle related Ground Processing Operations (GPO) mishaps from
the OPF, VAB and Pad A/B were identified and pulled from this data. These mishap data entries
were read one by one and categorized by the HFACS Human Error Levels and sublevels. Any
ambiguous mishap data entries were reviewed and consulted by Subject Matter Experts to assist in
appropriately assigning the mishaps to the best fitting HFACS Level or subcategory.

Survey participants were asked to evaluate 3 NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations
Scenarios involving the VAB, OPFs and Pads A/B. The participants were given a survey scale to
provide their Assessed Proportion of Affect (AOA) of the Error Producing Conditions identified for
the Scenarios. These values were recorded and calculated using the Human Error Assessment and
Reduction Technique (HEART) Human Error Probability (HEP) Formula.

From the experiment process, a binary logistics regression model was generated. Fitted
probabilities of future mishap occurrences based on the regression model and Human Error
Probabilities were calculated based on the survey participants’ assessed values. The binary logistics
regression model was also performed a second time with Stepwise Backward Elimination to simplify
the equation.

Chapter 5: The results of the binary regression equation identified several significant
contributors to NASA GPOs. These significant contributors were consistent with the literature
review and research performed in similar fields, such as Aviation and Aeronautics.
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Results from the HEART Human Error Probability (HEP) values, did not directly compare
with all of the HFACS binary logistics regression identified significant contributors, but there was a
comparable probability of occurrence as it relates to the Physical Environment and Confined Spaces.
Chapter 6: Based on the HFACS and HEART results and validation, the KSC Ground
Processing Operations Framework is confirmed as a valid approach for mishap analysis. The
Framework is flexible in that it allows modification for various unique operations that it will be
used for. In this research, the Scenarios can be changed and/or selected from diverse Operations
and locations. Due to the fact that the HEART tool has Generic Tasks, this can be modified to
specific tasks performed in the Operation.
Although all of the HEART HEP values did not have a direct correlation to all of the
HFACS binary logistic regression signification factors, the framework still encompasses the
HEART Generic Tasks that can be modified to meet unique job functions. The final stage of the
framework encompasses both HFACS human error levels and HEART Error Producing
Conditions, which from previous studies mentioned in the Model Validation section of Chapter 5,
indicate that the majority of human error related incidents fall under the “Unsafe Acts (Level 1)”
and “Preconditions for unsafe acts (Level 2)” HFACS Categories.
The literature review also reveals that from historical and research data the HFACS four
(4) Levels of Human Error encompasses the common categories that most mishaps fall into.
Lastly, the HFACS Sublevels, Common Errors and HEART Error Producing Conditions cover a
broad scope of errors that can occur during complex Operations. All of the error producing
conditions in the final stage of the NASA KSC GPO framework (Figure 9), cover contributing
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factors for both models.
Research Limitations
One of the limitations of this research framework is the subjectivity of the Assessed
Proportion of Affect (AOA). The Calculated Human Error Probability (HEP) can vary, due to its
dependency on the survey participants. The modification of the HEART and HFACS model is
also subject to the Subject Matter Experts’ recommendations for the models’ modification, in order
to make it more in line with NASA KSC Operations.

Identifying the human error related causes that led to the Mishap is limited by the detail of
the data provided in the “Detail Description” portion of the Mishap Data entry system. Therefore,
if a person entering the data leaves out any pertinent human error related information, this affects
the categorization of the Mishap. There is also a potential opportunity for “latent error” related
information to not be entered into the database, due to the fact that latent errors can be hidden and
may lay dormant within a system, in comparison to active errors, which effects are sensed almost
immediately, and are more visible and identifiable.

In this research general slips, trips and falls (e.g. someone tripping and falling as they are
getting out of a vehicle) annotated in the Mishap reports were not included in the categorization.
Only slips, trips and falls that occurred or were related to the execution of Ground Processing
Operations tasks were included.
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Research Contributions
The central contribution of this research is a unique complex operations framework that
incorporates three aspects: Human Reliability Analysis, Human Error Taxonomy and Human
Error Framework.
In the Literature Review chapter, questions were asked in order to identify the research
gaps concerning retrospectively analyzing mishaps relating to complex space systems such as
NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations. The research questions were in areas of: Human
Reliability Analysis, Human Error Taxonomies and Human Error Frameworks. This research
addressed all three areas.
Human Reliability Analysis
From the literature review we learned that Human Reliability Analysis is often referred to
as “the Probability of human failures,” as it pertains to critical system interactions (Salvendy,
2012). Literature research reveals that human reliability accounts for 60-80% of total system risk,
which makes it imperative that the HRA process be included and significantly involved in the
Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA) process (as cited in Salvendy, 2012).
In this research, two HRA tools were used: HFACS and HEART. The HFACS was used
to categorize retrospective Ground Processing Operations (GPO) Human Error related mishaps. A
binary logistics regression model was used for the statistical approach and a regression equation
was generated, which identified the significant factors to the occurrence of the human error related
Mishaps. This equation was then used to perform a Probability prediction of future Mishaps based
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on the presence of a specific contributing factors.
The HEART tool was used to generate a Human Error Probability based on survey
participants providing their Assessment of Affect that select Error Producing Conditions had on
select Ground Processing Operations Scenarios.
The contribution of this Human Reliability Analysis methodology, utilized both HRAs that
can be modified and used on other organizations and their retrospective historic mishap
occurrences.
Human Error Taxonomies
The HFACS was used to classify the Launch Vehicle Ground Processing Operations
Mishap Data. With the help of experienced Subject Matter Experts, the HFACS Taxonomy level
examples were modified to match the complex operations of NASA Ground Processing. The four
levels were kept the same; however, the sublevel examples were modified to match KSC Ground
Processing Operations. This model was used to categorize all of the Mishap data that corresponded
to Human Error. From this categorization, a binary logistics regression model was used to identify
the significant contributing factors.
Human Error Framework
The NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations Human Error Framework was developed
for the three (3) Scenarios that were the focus of this research. The Framework was built from the
first stage of the Scenarios, then to the Ground Processing Operations (GPO) Tasks performed at
the Kennedy Space Center, next the HFACS four levels of human error categories and their relation
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to the common errors, and finally the HFACS sublevels and specific Error Producing Conditions
that lead to Human Error mishaps at NASA. This framework was created specifically for KSC
Ground Processing Operations; however, it can be modified and used for complex operations, such
as other Space Operations and Space Programs on an International Level.
The advantage of this framework is that this study’s literature review found no known
framework that covers all three Human Reliability Analysis, Human Error Taxonomies and
Human Error Frameworks aspects, as it relates to Space Operations.

This research study

contributes to the Human Error body of knowledge by developing a model/framework that can be
used to address all three aspects. The framework uses a Human Reliability Analysis process
(HRA), that can classify and categorize human error causes (Human Error Taxonomy), generate a
binary logistics regression equation and provide generic tasks and common EPCs that can be used
and modified for other complex operations (Human Error Framework).
Research Methodology
This research also provides a methodology contribution. The following set of steps is a
research methodology approach that Space Operations and other complex organizations may use
to modify and apply to their unique processes.
1. Data Collection
a. Gather and/or collect Mishap data. Once the Mishap data is collected, determine if
all recorded mishaps will be included in the study or if mishaps during a specific
time frame, specific location, etc. will be included. This information will be used
for HFACS categorization.
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2. Qualitative Study
a. Using the HEART Methodology, develop specific modified examples of the
HEART “Generic Tasks” (From Table 8: Nominal Error Probability Table Generic
Tasks). This can be done by identifying equivalent specific tasks for the Operations
identified for the study. Modified examples may also be developed for the HEART
Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) (Table 9). Note: This was not implemented
for this research, but it is recommended for future research.
b. HEART Survey Development
i. Develop “operations related” scenarios in which Subject Matter Experts
(SMEs) can provide their subjective Assessment of Affect (AOA) (e.g.
Tables 15-20). This will be used to calculate Human Error Probabilities
(HEPs) based on SMEs’ experience.
ii. Develop SME survey questions to gather data for Assessment of Affect
(AOA) values (e.g. Appendix E: Survey/Voting Instrument). This is a
requirement for the HEART Method.

Assign corresponding Error

Producing Conditions (EPCs) and HEART Generic Tasks to the Survey
questions.
iii. Develop a Range Table/Chart scale (e.g. Table 26) for SMEs to provide
their AOA. The range of values must be in percentage form (e.g. 0.1 = 10%
of the EPC maximum effect) values.
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iv. Strategically select survey participants from “operations related”
experience. Determine statistical sample size for sufficient data (e.g. Figure
11).
v. Prior to conducting surveys, obtain appropriate Institutional Review Board
(IRB) approval. Once approved, conduct surveys and gather data results.
vi. Perform Survey One-Way ANOVA to determine statistical difference
between the SME AOA responses. If no difference, then go back and verify
survey data.
c. HFACS
i. Take the HFACS method’s four (4) Levels of human error contributing
factors and modify the examples to correspond with specific operations
identified for the study (e.g. Tables 22-25).
3. Quantitative Study
a. HEART
i. Using data from the SME Surveys, input the corresponding data (Generic
Task and EPC Values) into the HEART Human Error Probability (HEP)
Equation (reference Table 27).
ii. Use the HEART HEP results to identify areas of focus for priority or
potential mitigation. Note: May consider focusing on higher HEP values
first.
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b. HFACS
i. Sort the collected mishap data into the HFACS categories.
ii. Build a table to identify “1” for a Mishap/Incident event and “0” for a nonevent (e.g. Table 28).
iii. Use the binary logistics regression statistical analysis to generate a
regression equation. Note: Binary logistics model may need to be
performed again with stepwise backward elimination for simplicity.
iv. Verify the regression results to validate a good model by assessing the “p
values,” “Goodness-to-Fit” and “Odds ratio.” If validation requirements are
not met (see Results and Discussion chapter), then go back and review data
to verify data inputs, accuracy and no duplications.
v. Use the binary logistics regression equation to plug in “1” for an event, to
predict the probability of a future occurrence, if a contributing factor occurs.
vi. Review HFACS Fitted Probability values and Factorial Plots for validity.
If factorial plots are not consistent with probability value, then go back and
check the input data.
4. Data Validation
a. Use Triangulation to cross check and validate information (reference Methodology
chapter).
5. Research Objective Achieved
a. If achieved, the research is complete. If not achieved, return to Data Collection step.
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Figure 21: Research Methodology Contribution
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Recommendations for Future Research
After completing this study, below are proposed recommendations for future research:


The literature review of this research recognized a weakness within the area of a proven
analysis framework for classifying, assessing, investigation and analyzing human causes
of accident in complex space systems, such as NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations.
Future research can broaden the current scope to explore and identify what other existing
models of human error management can be integrated into complex space systems,
beyond what was conducted with the NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations.
This would provide further research and knowledge about other models and/or the
combination of their use.



This research identified contributing factors and the prediction of future potential
human error related mishaps; however, it did not provide mitigation measures for
controlling future occurrences. Broadening the focus of the current research to identify
what current methodologies or tools would be most effective in minimizing human
error related mishaps. With this focus, determine if a new methodology needs to be
established and if so, why. This would be essential to developing a robust controlled
method.



Future research can also focus on determining if the categorized leading contributors
in this analysis can be controlled by designing a methodology, model or tool to address
the entire Ground Processing Operations process, in lieu of focusing on only 3 areas
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(VAB, Pads A/B and OPFs), and if so, can this model be effective in creating an impact
on minimizing human error?


During the Literature Review, studies showed that the Human Error Assessment and
Reduction Technique (HEART) has remedial measures which are design considerations
for combating Error Producing Conditions (EPC) and tasks in a general sense (Williams,
1986). These remedial measures were not used or modified for this research. It is
recommended for future research, that if the HEART technique is incorporated, that these
remedial measures be reviewed and modified to effectively match NASA Aerospace tasks
and be considered as measures for combating NASA Operations EPCs or any Aerospace
Organization.



It is recommended that the HEART Generic tasks be expanded to cover more aerospace
human activities. The expansion will assist in creating more aerospace specificity to the
generic task types, which may enable easier assignments of detailed tasks for Human Error
Probability (HEP) calculations.



Modify the Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) weighted values to be more in line with the
NASA Aerospace tasks. This will assist in improved accuracy with HEP calculations.



Compare the results of HEART Human Error Probabilities (HEP) to research study results
from the Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM), Standardized
Plant Analysis Risk HRA Method (SPAR-H) and Technique for Human Error Rate
Prediction (THERP), which were recommended methods for flight crew operations per a
2006 study conducted by the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance to assess
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current Human Risk Assessments (HRA) methods and their applicability in the aerospace
industry for potential use and adaptation for current and future NASA systems and missions
(Chandler, 2006).


For use in Aerospace Operations, incorporating the THERP, CREAM, NARA, or SPARH HRA techniques (or any combination) in place of the HEART Method, in this research’s
framework can be considered.

Per the 2006 Chandler Study, these methods were

acknowledged as most pertinent to NASA’s HRA needs, for Space Missions (which
excludes ground process and command and control) (Chandler, 2006). Using these HRAs
within this research framework could identify beneficial analysis data for future use in
minimizing human error in ground processing operations and beyond.


For future research, it is recommended to focus more on identifying and analyzing latent
failures (which ultimately lead to active failures), when using this research’s framework.
As previously stated in the Literature Review chapter, active failures (also known active
errors) effects are felt almost immediately and latent errors, whose adverse consequences
may lie dormant within the system for a long time, only become evident when they combine
with other facts to breach the systems’ defenses (Rasmussen & Pedersen, 1984; as cited in
Reason, 1990). In the Results and Discussion chapter, research performed on Human
Factors in Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Operations used root categories of latent errors
and associated Nano codes with a binary logistic regression model for their analysis. Two
binary regression logistics models from this study were proven to be good (Army and
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Navy/Marines). Both had common latent error with a p value less than 0.05, relating to
two common root causing factors: “Organizational Process” and “Psycho-Behavior”
(Adverse Mental States). Future work focusing on these two latent factors, may be
something to consider for future research in addressing and attacking latent human errors
(Tvaryanas, 2006).
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